OSINFO - Open Sources Information

State Department Press Release

July 1, 2008

COUNTRY DESCRIPTION: Iran is a constitutional Islamic republic with a theocratic system of government where ultimate political authority is vested in a religious scholar, the Supreme Leader. Shia Islam is the official religion of Iran, and Islamic law is the basis of the authority of the state. The Iranian Constitution guarantees freedom of worship to Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians, though they are sometimes the subject of discrimination and repression. The workweek in Iran is Saturday through Thursday; however, many government offices and private companies are closed on Thursdays. Friday is the day of rest when all establishments are closed. Offices in Iran are generally open to the public during the morning hours only. Read the Department of State Background Notes on Iran for additional information.

ENTRY/EXIT REQUIREMENTS: Should you decide to travel to Iran despite the current Travel Warning, a passport and visa are required, except for travel to Kish Island. To obtain a visa, contact the Iranian Interests Section of the Embassy of Pakistan located at 2209 Wisconsin Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20007; tel. 202-965-4990, 91, 92, 93, 94, 99, fax 202-965-1073, 202-965-4990 (Automated Fax-On-Demand after office hours). Their web site is http: //www.daftar.org/Eng/default.asp'lang=eng.

U.S. citizens traveling to Iran are being fingerprinted upon entry. The Iranian press has reported that foreign tourists may obtain seven-day tourist visas at the airport in Tehran. However, U.S. citizens are not eligible to receive these visas and have to obtain valid visas from the Iranian Interests Section in Washington. Note: possession of a valid Iranian visa will not guarantee entry into the country. Some American travelers with valid visas have been refused entry at the border without explanation. U.S. citizens do not have to obtain a visa for travel from Dubai, United Arab Emirates, to Kish Island.

U.S. passports are valid for travel to Iran. However, the Iranian government does not recognize dual nationality and will treat U.S.-Iranian dual nationals solely as Iranian citizens. Thus, U.S. citizens who were born in Iran, who became naturalized citizens of Iran (e.g. through marriage to an Iranian citizen), and children of such persons-even those without Iranian passports who do not consider themselves Iranian-are considered Iranian nationals by Iranian authorities. Therefore, despite the fact that these individuals hold U.S. citizenship, under Iranian law, they must enter and exit Iran on an Iranian passport, unless the Iranian government has recognized a formal renunciation or loss of Iranian citizenship. Dual nationals may be subject to harsher legal treatment than a visitor with only American citizenship. (See section on Special Circumstances below.)

In the past, U.S.-Iranian dual nationals have been denied permission to enter/depart Iran using their U.S. passport; they have also had their U.S. passports confiscated upon arrival or departure. (Depending on the circumstances, the individuals were sometimes able to retrieve their U.S. passports after renouncing their Iranian citizenship.)

Recently, Iranian authorities have prevented a number of Iranian-American citizen academics, journalists, and others who traveled to Iran for personal reasons from leaving, and in some cases have detained and imprisoned them on various charges, including espionage and being a threat to the regime. Americans of Iranian origin should consider the risk of being targeted by authorities before planning travel to Iran. Iranian authorities may deny dual nationals' access to the United States Interests Section in Tehran, because they are considered to be solely Iranian citizens.

As a precaution, however, it is advisable for U.S.-Iranian dual nationals to obtain in their Iranian passports the necessary visas for the country which they will transit upon their return to the U.S. so that, if their U.S. passports are confiscated in Iran, they may depart Iran with their Iranian passport. These individuals can then apply for a new U.S. passport in that third country.

Dual nationals whose U.S. passports are confiscated may also obtain a "Confirmation of Nationality" from the U.S. Interests Section of the Embassy of Switzerland, which is the U.S. protecting power. This statement, addressed to the relevant foreign embassies in Tehran, enables the travelers to apply for third-country visas in Tehran. Dual nationals finding themselves in this situation should note in advance that the Swiss Embassy would issue this statement only after the traveler's U.S. nationality is confirmed and after some processing delay. Dual nationals must enter and depart the United States on U.S. passports.

Visa extensions are time-consuming and must be filed at least one week in advance of the expiration date. As of March 21, 2006, a foreign national and anyone accompanying him/her will pay a fine of 300,000 rials or 30,000 ottomans per day for each day of unauthorized stay in Iran.

All Iranian nationals, including U.S.-Iranian dual nationals, must have an exit permit stamped in their Iranian passports in order to depart Iran. The stamp is affixed to the Iranian passport when it is issued and remains valid until the expiration date of the passport. All Iranian nationals residing abroad and in Iran, including U.S.-Iranian dual nationals, are now required to pay an exit tax regardless of the duration of their stay in Iran. More specific information on Iranian passport and exit visa requirements may be obtained from the Iranian Interests Section of the Embassy of Pakistan in Washington, D.C.

Non-Iranian-national women who marry Iranian citizens gain Iranian nationality upon marriage. If the marriage takes place in Iran, the woman's American passport will be confiscated by Iranian authorities. They must have the consent of their husbands to leave Iran or, in his absence, must gain the permission of the local prosecutor. Iranian law combined with the lack of diplomatic relations between the United States and Iran means that the U.S. Interests Section in Tehran can provide only very limited assistance if an American woman married to an Iranian man has marital difficulties and/or encounters difficulty in leaving Iran.

After divorce or death of the husband, a foreign-born woman has the choice to renounce her Iranian citizenship but any of the couple's children will automatically be Iranian citizens and their citizenship is irrevocable. They will be required to enter and depart Iran on Iranian passports. For a divorce to be recognized it should be carried out in Iran or, if outside Iran, in accordance with Sharia law. Upon divorce, custody of the children normally goes to the mother until the child reaches age 7, at which point custody is automatically transferred to the father. However, if the courts determine that the father is unsuitable to raise the children, they may grant custody to the paternal grandfather or to the mother, if the mother has not renounced her Iranian citizenship and is normally resident in Iran. If the courts grant custody to the mother, she will need permission from the paternal grandfather or the courts to obtain exit visas for the minor children (under age 18) to leave the country. Iran is not a signatory to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. Please see the Department of State's International Parental Child Abduction flyer on Iran for further information.

Information about dual nationality or the prevention of international child abduction can be found on our web site. For further information about customs regulations, please read our Customs Information sheet.

SAFETY AND SECURITY: U.S. citizens who travel to Iran despite the Travel Warning should exercise caution throughout the country, but especially in the southeastern region where westerners have been victims of criminal gangs often involved in the smuggling of drugs and other contraband. American citizens should avoid travel to areas within 100 kilometers of the border with Afghanistan, within 10 kilometers of the border with Iraq, and generally anywhere east of the line from Bam and Bandar Abbas toward the Pakistan border.

Terrorist explosions have killed a number of people since 2005. Be aware that the Iranian government has blamed the U.S. and/or UK governments for involvement in the February 2007 bombing that killed Iranian military forces in Zahedan in the southeast and the 2005/2006 bombings in Ahvaz/Khuzestan in the southwest. A number of British firms were damaged in attacks in August and November 2005.

U.S. citizens are advised to avoid demonstrations and large public gatherings. Increased tension between Iran and the West over the past several years is a cause of concern for American travelers.

Iranian security personnel may at times place foreign visitors under surveillance. Hotel rooms, telephones and fax machines may be monitored, and personal possessions in hotel rooms may be searched. Photography near military and other government installations is strictly prohibited and could result in serious criminal charges, including espionage, which carries the death penalty.

For the latest security information, Americans traveling abroad should regularly monitor the Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs' web site at http: //travel.state.gov, where the current Travel Warnings and Travel Alerts, including the Travel Warning for Uzbekistan and the Worldwide Caution can be found.

Up-to-date information on safety and security, including safety and security in Iran, can also be obtained by calling 1-888-407-4747 toll free in the U.S. and Canada or, for callers outside the U.S. and Canada, a regular toll-line at 1-202-501-4444. These numbers are available from 8: 00 a.m. to 8: 00 p.m. Eastern Time, Monday through Friday (except U.S. federal holidays).

The Department of State urges American citizens to take responsibility for their own personal security while traveling overseas. For general information about appropriate measures travelers can take to protect themselves in an overseas environment, see the Department of State's pamphlet A Safe Trip Abroad.

CRIME: Major crime is generally not a problem for travelers in Iran, although foreigners occasionally have been victims of petty street crime. Young men in unmarked cars have robbed foreigners and young men on motor bikes have snatched bags. There have been reports of robberies by police impersonators, usually in civilian clothing. Insist on seeing the officer's identity card and request the presence of a uniformed officer/marked patrol car. Travelers should not surrender any documents or cash.

Travelers should not carry large amounts of hard currency. In view of the possibility of theft, passports, disembarkation cards, other important documents and valuables should be kept in hotel safes or other secure locations. Pre-booked taxis are safer than those hailed from the street.

Americans should check with their hotel or tour guide for information on local scams.

INFORMATION FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME: The loss or theft abroad of a U.S. passport should be reported immediately to the local police and the U.S. Interests Section at the Swiss Embassy in Tehran or the nearest U.S. Embassy or Consulate. Because of the lack of a U.S. Embassy in Iran, the processing time for a replacement passport takes longer at the U.S. Interests Section at the Swiss Embassy than elsewhere.

If you are the victim of a crime while overseas, in addition to reporting to local police, please contact the U.S. Interests Section for assistance. The staff can, for example, assist you to find appropriate medical care, contact family members or friends and explain how funds could be transferred. Although the investigation and prosecution of the crime is solely the responsibility of local authorities, Swiss Embassy officers can help you to understand the local criminal justice process and to find an attorney if needed.

The local equivalent of the "911" emergency line in Iran is as follows: 115 for ambulance service, 125 for fire and 110 for police. English speakers, however, are generally unavailable.

See our information on Victims of Crime.

MEDICAL FACILITIES AND HEALTH INFORMATION: Basic medical care and medicines are available in the principal cities, but may not be available in rural areas. Medical facilities do not meet U.S. standards and sometimes lack medicines and supplies.

Information on vaccinations and other health precautions, such as safe food and water precautions and insect bite protection, may be obtained from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's hotline for international travelers at 1-877-FYI-TRIP (1-877-394-8747) or via the CDC's web site at http: //wwwn.cdc.gov/travel/default.aspx. For information about outbreaks of infectious diseases abroad consult the World Health Organization's (WHO) web site at http: //www.who.int/en. Further health information for travelers is available at http: //www.who.int/ith/en.

In 2006, there were reports of Crimean Congo Hemorrhagic Fever, mostly in the southeastern Sistan va Baluchistan province. See www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs208/en for more information. Iranian authorities have confirmed outbreaks of avian influenza (bird flu) in January 2008 in northern Iran, as well as earlier reports among wild swans in the Anzali Wetlands and in domestic poultry in the northern provinces of Azerbaijan and Gilan. There have been a number of fatalities from avian flu reported in eastern Turkey, 45 kilometers from the Iranian border.

MEDICAL INSURANCE: The Department of State strongly urges Americans to consult with their medical insurance company prior to traveling abroad to confirm whether their policy applies overseas and whether it will cover emergency expenses such as a medical evacuation. Please see our information on medical insurance overseas.

TRAFFIC SAFETY AND ROAD CONDITIONS: While in a foreign country, U.S. citizens may encounter road conditions that differ significantly from those in the United States. The information below concerning Iran is provided for general reference only, and may not be totally accurate in a particular location or circumstance:

Travelers in possession of International Driver's Permits may drive in Iran, though the U.S. Interests Section in Iran does not recommend that tourists drive in Iran. Iran has a very high rate of traffic accidents, the second highest cause of mortality in the country. Drivers throughout Iran tend to ignore traffic lights, traffic signs and lane markers. Urban streets are not well lit. It is therefore particularly dangerous to drive at night. Sidewalks in urban areas only exist on main roads and are usually obstructed by parked cars. In the residential areas, few sidewalks exist. Drivers almost never yield to pedestrians at crosswalks. If you are involved in an accident, no matter how minor, do not leave the scene. Wait until the police arrive to file a report.

Iranian authorities sometimes set up informal roadblocks, both in cities and on highways, often manned by young, inexperienced officers. They are often suspicious of foreigners. Ensure you carry a form of identification with you and avoid getting into disputes.

Pollution levels from cars are very high, particularly in Tehran, which can trigger respiratory problems.

Please refer to our Road Safety page for more information.

AVIATION SAFETY OVERSIGHT: As there is no direct commercial air service to the U.S. by carriers registered in Iran, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has not assessed the Government of Iran's Civil Aviation Authority for compliance with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) aviation safety standards. For more information, travelers may visit the FAA's web site at http: //www.faa.gov/safety/programsinitiatives/oversight/iasa.

Civil aviation in Iran continues to experience air incidents and accidents, including five crashes with fatalities between April 20, 2005, and November 27, 2006. Incidents have included engine failure and planes veering off the runway.

SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES: The Iranian Government has seized the passports and blocked the departure of foreigners who work in Iran on tax/commercial disputes.

In addition to being subject to all Iranian laws, U.S. citizens who also possess Iranian citizenship may also be subject to other laws that impose special obligations on citizens of Iran, such as military service or taxes. Iranian-citizen males aged 18-34 are required to perform military service, unless exempt. Iranian-Americans, even those born in the U.S., are included.

Dual nationals sometimes have their U.S. passports confiscated and may be denied permission to leave Iran, or encounter other problems with Iranian authorities. Likewise, Iranian authorities may deny dual nationals' access to the U.S. Interests Section in Tehran, because they are considered to be solely Iranian citizens. Refer to the above section entitled "Entry/Exit Requirements" for additional information concerning dual nationality.

U.S. citizens who are not dual U.S.-Iran nationals are encouraged to carry a copy of their U.S. passport (biodata page and page with Iranian visa) with them at all times, so that if questioned by local officials, proof of U.S. citizenship is readily available. Carry some other form of identification with you, such as a drivers license or other photo identification at all times as well.

Credit cards and bank cards are not widely accepted in Iran. It is difficult to change dollars to rials in Iranian banks and you may not be able to access your U.S. bank accounts via the Internet from Iran. You will not be able to access your U.S. bank accounts using ATMs in Iran. Travelers checks can be difficult to exchange. Bring enough hard currency to cover your stay, but make sure you declare this currency upon entry. There is no Western Union or similar institution and bank transfers may not be possible. Exchange money only at banks or an authorized currency exchange facility, not on the street, and keep your exchange receipts.

Pre-paid overseas calling cards are available at most newsagents. The Internet is widely used in Iran. There are Internet cafes in most hotels. Usage may be monitored.

Do not work illegally. You will be deported, fined and/or imprisoned. You may also be prevented from entering the country again.

Islamic law is strictly enforced in Iran. Alcohol is forbidden. Importation of pork products is banned. Consult a guide book on Iran to determine how to dress and behave properly and respectfully. Women should expect to wear a headscarf and jacket that covers the arms and upper body while in public. There may be additional dress requirements at certain religious sites, e.g., women might need to put on a chador (which covers the whole body except the face) at some shrines. During the holy month of Ramadan, you should in general observe the Muslim tradition of not eating, drinking or smoking in public from sunrise to sunset each day, though there are exemptions for foreign travelers who eat in hotel restaurants. (See the Criminal Penalties section below for more information.)

In general, it is best to ask before taking photographs of people. Hobbies like photography and those involving the use of binoculars (e.g., bird-watching) can be misunderstood and get you in trouble with security officials. (See the Safety and Security section above for warnings on photography.)

For specific information regarding Iranian customs regulations, contact the Iranian Interests Section of the Embassy of Pakistan in Washington, DC.

Please see our Customs Information outbind: //1/#Hlk124824477 for U.S. regulations.

Most laptops are controlled items. It is unlawful to bring controlled items into Iran, even on a temporary basis, unless specifically authorized by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) in a manner consistent with the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992 and other relevant law.

U.S. Government economic sanctions still govern imports of Iranian-origin goods and services and exports to Iran. Except for carpets and foodstuffs, and information or informational materials and gifts valued at $100 or less, the importation of Iranian-origin goods or services into the United States is prohibited. The exportation or re-exportation of goods, technology or services directly or indirectly from the United States or by a U.S. person to Iran also is prohibited, except in the following cases: articles donated to relieve human suffering (such as food, clothing and medicine), gifts valued at $100 or less, licensed exports of agricultural commodities, medicine and medical devices, and trade in informational materials. The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), Department of Treasury, provides guidance to the public on the interpretation of the current economic sanctions. For further information, consult OFAC's Compliance Programs Division, at 202-622-2490, visit the OFAC web site at http: //www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/, or obtain information via fax at 202-622-0077. For information concerning licensing of exports, contact OFAC's Licensing Division at:

Licensing Division Office of Foreign Assets Control U.S. Department of the Treasury 1500 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Treasury Annex Washington, DC 20220 Telephone (202) 622-2480; Fax (202) 622-1657

Iran is prone to earthquakes. Many people have died in recent years, most notably in the city of Bam in 2003, killing 30,000. In February 2005, an earthquake measuring 6.4 on the Richter scale struck Zarand in southeast Iran. In March 2006, several earthquakes occurred in Restan province, western Iran, killing around 100 and injuring 1200.

CRIMINAL PENALTIES: While in a foreign country, a U.S. citizen is subject to that country's laws and regulations, which sometimes differ significantly from those in the United States and may not afford the protections available to the individual under U.S. law. Penalties for breaking the law can be more severe than in the United States for similar offenses. Persons violating Iranian laws, even unknowingly, may be expelled, arrested or imprisoned. Fines, public floggings, and long prison terms are common. Former Muslims who have converted to other religions, as well as persons who encourage Muslims to convert, are subject to arrest and possible execution. Drinking, possession of alcoholic beverages and drugs, un-Islamic dress, as well as public displays of affection with a member of the opposite sex are considered to be crimes. Relations between non-Muslim men and Muslim women are illegal. Adultery, sex outside of marriage and gay sex are all illegal under Iranian law and carry the death penalty. DVDs depicting sexual relations and magazines showing unveiled women are forbidden. Penalties for possession, use, or trafficking in illegal drugs in Iran are severe and convicted offenders can expect long jail sentences and heavy fines. Iran executes many people each year on drug-related charges. Engaging in sexual conduct with children or using or disseminating child pornography in a foreign country is a crime, prosecutable in the United States. Please see our information on Criminal Penalties.

U.S. citizens in Iran who violate Iranian laws, including laws that are unfamiliar to Westerners (such as those regarding the proper wearing of apparel,) may face severe penalties.

The Iranian Government reportedly has the names of all individuals who filed claims against Iran at the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal at The Hague pursuant to the 1981 Algerian Accords. In addition, the Iranian Government reportedly has compiled a list of the claimants who were awarded compensation in the Iran Claims Program administered by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission. The Iranian government is allegedly targeting award-holders who travel to Iran. It is reported that upon some claimants' entry into Iran, Iranian authorities question them as to the status of payment of their respective awards with a view to recouping the award money. It is also reported that the Iranian Government has threatened to prevent U.S. claimants who visit Iran from departing the country until they make arrangements to repay part or all of their award.

CHILDREN'S ISSUES: For information see our Office of Children's Issues web pages on intercountry adoption and international parental child abduction.

REGISTRATION/U.S. INTERESTS SECTION LOCATION: There is no U.S. Embassy or Consulate in Iran. The Embassy of Switzerland serves as the protecting power for U.S. interests in Iran. The U.S. Interests Section at the Swiss Embassy is currently located at Afrika Avenue, West Farzan Street, no. 59, Tehran. The telephone numbers for the U.S. Interests Section are (98) 021-8878-2964 and 98-021-8879-2364, fax 98-021-8877-3265, email: tie.vertretung@eda.admin.ch. The workweek is Sunday through Thursday. Public service hours are 8: 00 a.m. - 12: 00 noon. The Interests Section does not issue U.S. visas or accept visa applications. The limited consular services provided to U.S. citizens in Tehran include:

(a) registering U.S. citizens;

(b) answering inquiries concerning the welfare and whereabouts of U.S. citizens in Iran;

(c) rendering assistance in times of distress or physical danger;

(d) providing U.S. citizens with passport and Social Security card applications and other citizenship forms for approval at the U.S. Embassy in Bern, Switzerland;

(e) performing notarial services on the basis of accommodation; and,

(f) taking provisional custody of the personal effects of deceased U.S. citizens.

Americans living or traveling in Iran are encouraged to register with the nearest U.S. Embassy or Consulate through the State Department's travel registration website https: //travelregistration.state.gov/ so that they can obtain updated information on travel and security within Iran. They may also register on the web site of the U.S. Interests Section at www.eda.admin.ch/tehran. Americans without Internet access may register directly with the nearest U.S. Embassy or Consulate before flying to Iran. By registering, American citizens make it easier for the U.S. Interests Section to contact them in case of emergency.

* * * * * *

This replaces the Consular Information Sheet dated June 5, 2007, to update the sections on Entry/Exit Requirements, Safety and Security, Crime, Information for Victims of Crime, Medical Facilities and Health Information, Traffic Safety and Road Conditions, Special Circumstances, Criminal Penalties and Registration/U.S. Interests Section Location.

Office of State Department Public Communication Division, 202-647-6575

M Shamsur Rabb Khan
Freelancer
e-mail: samsur.khan@gmail.com

China's intensified cyber warfare against India is becoming a serious threat to national security. The desire to possess 'electronic dominance' over India has compelled Chinese hackers to attack many crucial Indian websites and over the past one and a half years, they have mounted almost daily attacks on Indian computer networks - both government and private. In October 2007, for example, Chinese hackers defaced over 143 Indian websites. A recent attack on a website called www.cabsec.gov.in, which is the nerve centre of the country's administration, was particularly hostile, due to which the site remained defaced for hours.

Web defacement is the term applied to the unauthorized modification of a website. In its place, other terms, such as web jacking, vandalism, cyber graffiti are also used. Phishing, on the other hand, is a term derived from fishing, and is a fraudulent activity on the Internet to acquire personal information. As in fishing, where the fisherman uses a bait to catch fish, in phishing, the hackers use spoofed e-mails to lure innocent Internet users and get their personal information like bank account number, credit card details, password and so on. According to the Gartner Survey, financial losses due to phishing attacks have risen to more than US$3.2 billion in the year 2007 alone.

In April 2008, Indian intelligence agencies detected Chinese hackers breaking into the computer network of the Ministry of External Affairs forcing the government to think about devising a new strategy to fortify the system. Though the intelligence agencies failed to get the identity of the hackers, the IP addresses left behind suggested Chinese hands. While hacking is a normal practice around the world, the cyber warfare threat from China has serious implications. At the core of the assault is the fact that the Chinese are constantly scanning and mapping India's official networks.

According to India's Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In), in the year 2006, a total of 5,211 Indian websites were defaced, on an average of about 14 websites per day. Of the total number of sites that were hacked and defaced, an overwhelming majority were in the .com domain (90 cases) followed by 26 in the .in domain. As many as 11 defacement incidents were also recorded in the .org domain. Of all hacking incidents in October, about 61 per cent related to phishing, 27 per cent to unauthorized scanning and 8 per cent to viruses/worms under the malicious code category. India, like the western countries, has been witnessing a massive rise in phishing attacks with incidents in 2006 180 per cent higher than in 2005, and the trend carrying through into 2007.

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Posted on Jun 26, 2008

By Scott Ritter

I am a former U.N. weapons inspector. I started my work with the United Nations in September 1991, and between that date and my resignation in August 1998, I participated in over 30 inspections, 14 as chief inspector. The United Nations Special Commission, or UNSCOM, was the organization mandated by the Security Council with the implementation of its resolutions requiring Iraq to be disarmed of its weapons-of-mass-destruction capabilities. While UNSCOM oversaw the areas of chemical and biological weapons, and ballistic missiles, it shared the nuclear file with the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA. As such, UNSCOM, through a small cell of nuclear experts on loan from the various national weapons laboratories, would coordinate with the nuclear safeguards inspectors from the IAEA, organized into an “Action Team” dedicated to the Iraq nuclear disarmament problem. UNSCOM maintained political control of the process, insofar as its executive chairman was the only one authorized to approve a given inspection mission. At first, the IAEA and UNSCOM shared the technical oversight of the inspection process, but soon this was transferred completely to the IAEA’s Action Team, and UNSCOM’s nuclear staff assumed more of an advisory and liaison function.

In August 1992 I began cooperating closely with IAEA’s Action Team, traveling to Vienna, where the IAEA maintained its headquarters. The IAEA had in its possession a huge cache of documents seized from Iraq during a series of inspections in the summer of 1991 and, together with other U.N. inspectors, I was able to gain access to these documents for the purpose of extracting any information which might relate to UNSCOM’s non-nuclear mission. These documents proved to be very valuable in that regard, and a strong working relationship was developed. Over the coming years I frequently traveled to Vienna, where I came to know the members of the IAEA Action Team as friends and dedicated professionals. Whether poring over documents, examining bits and pieces of equipment (the IAEA kept a sample of an Iraqi nuclear centrifuge in its office) or ruminating about the difficult political situation that was Iraq over wine and cheese on a Friday afternoon, I became familiar with the core team of experts who composed the IAEA Action Team.

I bring up this history because during the entire time of my intense, somewhat intimate cooperation with the IAEA Action Team, one name that never entered into the mix was David Albright. Albright is the president of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS, an institute which he himself founded), and has for some time now dominated the news as the “go-to” guy for the U.S. mainstream media when they need “expert opinion” on news pertaining to nuclear issues. Most recently, Albright could be seen commenting on a report he authored, released by ISIS on June 16, in which he discusses the alleged existence of a computer owned by Swiss-based businessmen who were involved in the A.Q. Khan nuclear black market ring. According to Albright, this computer contained sensitive design drawings of a small, sophisticated nuclear warhead which, he speculates, could fit on a missile delivery system such as that possessed by Iran.

I have no objection to an academically based think tank capable of producing sound analysis about the myriad nuclear-based threats the world faces today. But David Albright has a track record of making half-baked analyses derived from questionable sources seem mainstream. He breathes false legitimacy into these factually challenged stories by cloaking himself in a résumé which is disingenuous in the extreme. Eventually, one must begin to question the motives of Albright and ISIS. No self-respecting think tank would allow itself to be used in such an egregious manner. The fact that ISIS is a creation of Albright himself, and as such operates as a mirror image of its founder and president, only underscores the concerns raised when an individual lacking in any demonstrable foundation of expertise has installed himself into the mainstream media in a manner that corrupts the public discourse and debate by propagating factually incorrect, illogical and misleading information.

In his résumé Albright prominently advertises himself as a “former U.N. weapons inspector.” Indeed, this is the first thing that is mentioned when he describes himself to the public. Witness an Op-Ed piece in The Washington Post which he jointly authored with Jacqueline Shire in January 2008, wherein he is described as such: “David Albright, a former U.N. weapons inspector, is president of the Institute for Science and International Security.” His erstwhile U.N. credentials appear before his actual job title. Now, this is not uncommon. I do the same thing when describing myself, noting that I was a former U.N. weapons inspector in Iraq from 1991 to 1998. I feel comfortable doing this, because it’s true and because my résumé is relevant to my writing. In his official ISIS biography, Albright details his “U.N. inspector” experience as such: “Albright cooperated actively with the IAEA Action Team from 1992 until 1997, focusing on analyses of Iraqi documents and past procurement activities. In June 1996, he was the first non-governmental inspector of the Iraqi nuclear program. On this inspection mission, Albright questioned members of Iraq’s former uranium enrichment programs about their statements in Iraq’s draft Full, Final, and Complete Declaration.”

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Scott Ritter was a U.N. weapons inspector in Iraq from 1991 to 1998.

AP photo / Henry Arvidsson / United Nations

An Iraqi Scud missile awaits destruction by United Nations weapons inspectors in Iraq in this undated file photo.

Perspectives on Politics provides political insight on important problems through rigorous, broad-based research and integrative thought. The journal enables members of different subfields to speak with one another--and with knowledgeable people outside the discipline--about issues of common interest; it aspires to be provocative, even edgy, while maintaining the highest academic standards. Each issue of the journal also features reviews of over 50 books.

The following information was released by the United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG):

The Conference on Disarmament today heard statements from Australia, Japan, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Canada, France, Sri Lanka, China and New Zealand on Presidential proposal CD/1840 to end the impasse in the Conference and on regional nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts.

The incoming President of the Conference, Ambassador Christina Rocca of the United States, said it was unquestioned that CD/1840 was a compromise, and thus by definition, unable to meet anyone's goals perfectly, but it was well-suited to advance everyone's interests and to get the Conference back to work. If it was adopted, all would win much and lose a little. While the United States would continue to focus on CD/1840 as the desired outcome of this year's activities in the Conference, with the support of the P6, they proposed a series of informal meetings during the third part of the 2008 session of the Conference in late July and in August. The United States had asked the seven Coordinators to resume their roles and to chair the discussions. The full exchange of views in these renewed informal discussions would help refresh all the issues in Members' minds, would help advance consensus on CD/1840, and would help inform the Conference on its final report.

Australia informed the Conference of an announcement made by the Australian Prime Minister in a speech in Japan on the establishment of an International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. In a joint statement with the Japanese Prime Minister, Australia and Japan had renewed their determination to strengthen the international disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regime and to cooperate closely to achieve a successful outcome to the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. The objective of the Commission was to enhance global efforts to strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty by paving the way for a successful Review Conference in 2010.

Japan said that, on 12 June, the Japanese Prime Minister and the Prime Minister of Australia had released a joint statement to reaffirm the particular importance of the Japan-Australia relationship and to strengthen further the comprehensive and strategic partnership between the two countries. Both leaders had renewed their determination to strengthen the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Japan had also welcomed the Australian Prime Minister's proposal to establish an international commission on nuclear non-proliferation. On CD/1840, Japan believed it was a well-balanced compromise.

The Russian Federation said not everything in CD/1840 suited the Russian Federation and it was sure that all other delegations were not fully satisfied either. The Russian Federation wanted a stronger focus on prevention of an arms race in outer space which was a priority for the country. The Russian Federation was interested in having a negotiating mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Nevertheless, the Russian Federation was prepared not to oppose it with the view of ensuring the quickest return of the Conference to work.

South Africa said the consensus rule in the Conference had often been mentioned as the main reason why the Conference had not been able to negotiate anything in the last couple of years. But was it not perhaps the misuse of the consensus rule, rather than the rule itself, that had created the problem. The consensus rule did not apply itself, it was the Members of the Conference that chose when and how to apply it. When it was used to block the commencement, not the finalization, of negotiations, one could perhaps understand why some referred to the "tyranny of consensus". South Africa did not believe that CD/1840 was perfect. However, it represented that which was possible and practical under the present circumstances. South Africa stood ready to join a consensus on CD/1840.

Canada, speaking also on behalf of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), presented to the Conference the report on a conference entitled: "Security in Space: the Next Generation", that had taken place earlier this year. The conference had been the latest in a series of annual conferences held by UNIDIR on the issues of space security, the peaceful uses of outer space and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

France referred to the statement by the President of the French Republic, Nicolas Sarkozy, on 21 March in Cherbourg proposing an ambitious disarmament plan, saying that these transparency measures were unprecedented for a nuclear weapon State. The President of France proposed to invite international experts to come and witness the dismantling of the fissile material for weapons facilities in Pierrelatte and Marcoule. Today, France renewed this invitation, and a visit to these facilities would be organized on 16 September. All Member States were invited to send representatives.

Sri Lanka said CD/1840 was a good basis for discussion, Sri Lanka had no doubt about that. However, Sri Lanka wished to draw attention to some underlying structural anomalies which had to be addressed if this effort was to be successful. CD/1840 privileged one agenda item over others. This particular item elevated over the others involved certain Member States more than certain others. If those Member States felt that their fundamental national interests were at variance with the spirit of CD/1840, then it was not a question of a handful of holdouts. Those countries concerns had to be seriously engaged with. If it was the perception of these States that their core strategic interests were at stake, then the Conference had to do better. Doing better could mean looking afresh at the other agenda items.

China hoped that the relevant parties would continue to make efforts to further conduct a constructive dialogue and consultations so that they were able to narrow the differences and reach consensus on a programme of work which was acceptable to all. In general, China was ready to make joint efforts with all the relevant delegations to push forward progress in the Conference.

New Zealand supported the President's comment that moving forward to reach consensus on the basis of CD/1840 was the best basis for advancing the work in the Conference. As far as its national position was concerned, New Zealand would be happy to commence negotiations on any of the core items before the Conference. As a non nuclear weapon State and as a State which had taken strong positions on nuclear weapons, New Zealand particularly wished for the start of negotiations on nuclear disarmament. The reality was that no delegation here was in a position to begin serious negotiations on all the core issues before the Conference. A Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty would contribute to nuclear disarmament. New Zealand would like to see the treaty deal with verification and existing stocks and would argue in the negotiations in favour of including verification and existing stocks.

According to draft decision CD/1840 by the 2008 Presidents of the Conference, the Conference would appoint Chile as Coordinator to preside over substantive discussions on nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war; appoint Japan as Coordinator to preside over negotiations, without any preconditions, on a non-discriminatory and multilateral treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, thus providing all delegations with the opportunity to actively pursue their respective positions and priorities, and to submit proposals on any issue they deem relevant in the course of negotiations; appoint Canada as Coordinator to preside over substantive discussions dealing with issues related to prevention of an arms race in outer space; appoint Senegal as Coordinator to preside over substantive discussions dealing with appropriate arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; and would request those Coordinators to present a report to the Conference on the progress of work before the conclusion of the session. The Conference would also decide to request the Coordinators for the agenda items previously appointed by the 2008 Presidents (i.e., new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems for such weapons, radiological weapons; comprehensive programme of disarmament; and transparency in armament) to continue their work during the current session.

Draft Decision CD/1840 builds on an earlier proposal submitted by the 2007 P-6 (CD/2007/L.1), and its related documents CRP.5 and CRP.6, combining those three texts in a single document.

The Conference on Disarmament will hold a public plenary at 10 a.m. on Wednesday, 25 June, to listen to a statement by Javier Solana, High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union. This will be the last public plenary of the second part of the 2008 session of the Conference. The third and last part of the 2008 session of the Conference will be held from 28 July to 12 September.

Statements

CHRISTINA ROCCA (United States), Incoming President of the Conference on Disarmament, said it was an honour to preside over the Conference. The common sense of purpose shown by all members of the Presidency, their joint aim in getting the Conference back to work, the genuine collegialitiy, was all impressive and gratifiying. It was a demonstration of how harmony could be created from disparate voices, given the will to do so. Some delegations had questioned the need for the differentiation among the key issues shown by CD/1840. It was unquestioned that CD/1840 was a compromise, and thus by definition, unable to meet anyone's goals perfectly, but it was well-suited to advance everyone's interests and to get the Conference back to work. If it was adopted, all would win much and lose a little.

As President, the United States intended to continue to work closely with the Six Presidents and to continue to support the direction set through the hard work of the previous presidents this year. The United States would remain open to supporting broad dialogue, would continue consultations and would work to build upon and broaden the already almost unanimous support underlying CD/1840. While the United States would continue to focus on CD/1840 as the desired outcome of this year's activities in the Conference, with the support of the P6, they proposed a series of informal meetings during the third part of the 2008 session of the Conference in late July and in August. The United States had asked the seven Coordinators to resume their roles and to chair the discussions. The full exchange of views in these renewed informal discussions would help refresh all the issues in members' minds, would help advance consensus on CD/1840, and would help inform the Conference on its final report. Each agenda item would get equal treatment, a half-day meeting. There was still enough time left this year to return the Conference to substantive work and to restore value to the seemingly empty phrase that the Conference on Disarmament was the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body. The Conference could accomplish substantive work, even late in its session, and the United States encouraged all delegations to show flexibility in the deliberations and enthusiasm in the discussions.

CAROLINE MILLAR (Australia) informed the Conference about an announcement made by the Australian Prime Minister in a speech in Japan on the establishment of an International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. In a joint statement with the Japanese Prime Minister, Australia and Japan had renewed their determination to strengthen the international disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regime and to cooperate closely to achieve a successful outcome to the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. Australia had long taken a leading role on arms control and disarmament. The International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament would follow up on the important work that had been undertaken by the Canberra Commission and the Tokyo Forum in the 1990s. The Commission's findings would be considered by a major international conference of experts in late 2009. The objective of the Commission was to enhance global efforts to strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty by paving the way for a successful Review Conference in 2010. It was expected that commissioners would be senior international experts from a range of countries.

Ms. Millar also voiced Australia's full support for the Presidential Proposal; it built on the excellent work conducted by last year's presidential platform. The draft represented a balanced and well-considered proposal for commencing their work and did not prejudge any countries' position on any core issue and it allowed them to commence meaningful work on all four core issues. Australia supported the document and found it difficult to accept the prospect that the Conference would for another year fail to fulfil its mandate. The few States who had not accepted the document yet were urged to reconsider urgently their positions. It was unacceptable that the world's principal forum for negotiations on arms control and disarmament was still unable to commence substantive work.

SUMIO TARUI (Japan) said that, on 12 June, the Japanese Prime Minister and the Prime Minister of Australia had released a joint statement to reaffirm the particular importance of the Japan-Australia relationship and to strengthen further the comprehensive and strategic partnership between the two countries. Both leaders had renewed their determination to strengthen the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Japan had also welcomed the Australian Prime Minister's proposal to establish an international commission on nuclear non-proliferation. Both countries were bilaterally consulting on the specific terms of cooperation for this commission and it was hoped that it would contribute to reinforcing the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime in the lead up to the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference.

Turning to the issue of the Presidential Draft Decision CD/1840, Japan commended the efforts of the six Presidents. Japan supported the President's approach of continuing consultations with the Member States that still had concerns over the draft decision. The draft was seen as a well-balanced compromise. With regard to a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, no delegations had expressed opposition to negotiations on the prohibition of production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, notwithstanding differences over the modality and the scope of such negotiations. While stating the clear objective of negotiating such a ban the draft decision in no way prejudged the outcome of negotiations without preconditions. Thus, the draft decision allowed each Member State to freely pursue their respective positions and priorities as for what should constitute the modality and the scope of negotiations. For advancement in disarmament, the discussions in each field should progress independently and on its own merit. Japan also felt that it was inappropriate to hold back potential progress in one area just because of slower progress in others. CD/1840 allowed substantive discussions on the other three core agenda items and therefore they failed to find a reason against accepting it. It was indisputable that the Conference would contribute to the improvement of international security by fulfilling its role. By continuing the deadlock in the Conference, they were perpetuating the ongoing crisis in the international security environment that had been created by their own failure to act. Japan implored all Members to act now with the outmost urgency.

VALERY LOSCHININ (Russian Federation) believed that during the winter session this year the Conference had carried out useful work and the result had been draft decision CD/1840 by the P6. This was the result of major work, numerous consultations and the logical conclusion of all efforts over the last period to normalize the situation in the Conference on Disarmament. Of course not everything in CD/1840 suited the Russian Federation and it was sure that all other delegations were not fully satisfied either. The Russian Federation wanted a stronger focus on prevention of an arms race in outer space which was a priority for the country. The Russian Federation was interested in having a negotiating mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Nevertheless, the Russian Federation was prepared not to oppose it with the view of ensuring the quickest return of the Conference to work. It was only by steps towards each other could the Conference achieve consensus.

The Russian Federation was interested in seeing the consultations the President would hold with Member States and regional groups and hoped that they would be constructive and productive. The Russian Federation also believed that seeking a consensus on the programme of work would also be facilitated by in-depth thematic discussions on all the issues which would bring the Conference closer to a consensus. The Russian Federation supported the proposal of the President to organize a concluding round of informal discussions for this year's session. The Russian Federation was convinced that the discussions planned for 5 August on prevention of an arms race in outer space would enable the Conference to continue the topical discussion started this spring. However, half a day would not be enough to discuss all the different aspects of the draft treaty, so in this connection, the Russian Federation and China suggested that the informal discussions be continued on 6 August, with the participation of experts from capitals. Experts from the Russian Federation would be available to respond to questions and comments.

GLAUDINE MTSHALI (South Africa) said since the tabling of document CD/1840 during March of this year, the delegation of South Africa had heard many delegations lament the inability to agree on a programme of work and the stalemate or impasse that existed in the Conference. However, if one looked at the Conference on Disarmament, one could not claim that the structure of the Conference did not allow negotiations to take place. Similarily, the rules of procedure were often said to be in need of a revision. But the rules of procedure did not prohibit negotiations. The consensus rule in the Conference had often been mentioned as the main reason why the Conference had not been able to negotiate anything in the last couple of years. But was it not perhaps the misuse of the consensus rule, rather than the rule itself, that had created the problem. The consensus rule did not apply itself, it was the Members of the Conference that chose when and how to apply it. When it was used to block the commencement, not the finalization, of negotiations, one could perhaps understand why some referred to the "tyranny of consensus".

In his closing remarks as President of the last week, the Ambassador of the United Kingdom reminded delegations that the perfect should not become the enemy of the good. South Africa would go even further by saying that if the Conference waited for the perfect programme of work, it would wait for a very long time. South Africa did not believe that CD/1840 was perfect. However, whilst not perfect, it believed that CD/21840 represented that which was possible and practical under the present circumstances. All Member States obviously had priorities, but different priorities need not necessarily be mutually exclusive. South Africa stood ready to join a consensus on CD/1840.

MARIUS GRINIUS (Canada) said that Canada had the honour to table in the Conference on Disarmament, on behalf of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), the report on a conference entitled: "Security in Space: the Next Generation", that had taken place earlier this year. The conference had been the latest in a series of annual conferences held by UNIDIR on the issues of space security, the peaceful uses of outer space and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. This initiative had been one of the few opportunities to bring together members of the Conference on Disarmament with academics, experts, non-governmental organizations, scientists and the private sector to discuss the challenges in space and to stimulate their thinking on how to address these issues. As a first-time participant at the conference, he had found it highly educational.

JEAN-FRANCOIS DOBELLE (France) said with regard to the programme of work of the Conference and proposal CD/1840, France supported the statement made by the Slovenian presidency of the European Union on 15 May. The President of the French Republic, Nicolas Sarkozy, in a statement on 21 March in Cherbourg, proposed an ambitious disarmament plan and decided on transparency measures unprecedented for a nuclear weapon State. France was firmly determined to move forward on this path. At Cherbourg, the President of France proposed to invite international experts to come and witness the dismantling of the fissile material for weapons facilities in Pierrelatte and Marcoule. Today, France renewed this invitation, and a visit to these facilities would be organized on 16 September. All Member States were invited to send representatives, and in the coming weeks, France would be providing all the necessary practical information. France was using transparency to strengthen confidence, and the invitation today showed this. Confidence, transparency and reciprocity were the foundation for collective security and disarmament. France called on the international community to join in the realization of the action plan proposed by the President of France.

DAYAN JAYATILLEKA (Sri Lanka) said he wished to make two different notes. One was a note of optimism. Looking at the global political horizon today, it was possible to discern a prospect to change which could enable the international community to make the idea of a comprehensive and general disarmament a possibility. This feeling of optimism had last been seen in Rekyavik in 1996. Sri Lanka wished to share this optimism with the Conference and hoped that the Conference would be able to make serious progress in the near future. The second note he wished to make was one of realism. Sri Lanka had long been associated with disarmament; because of its location, Sri Lanka had a stake in this issue. However, Sri Lanka believed the Conference had to be more realistic than it had been so far. CD/1840 was a good basis for discussion; Sri Lanka had no doubt about that. However, Sri Lanka wished to draw attention to some underlying structural anomalies which had to be addressed if this effort was to be successful. CD/1840 privileged one agenda item over others. There may be a firm logic behind that. However, this particular item elevated over the others involved certain Member States more than certain others. If those Member States felt that their fundamental national interests were at variance with the spirit of CD/1840, then it was not a question of a handful of holdouts. Those countries concerns had to be seriously engaged with. If it was the perception of these States that their core strategic interests were at stake, then the Conference had to do better. Doing better could mean looking afresh at the other agenda items. For certain States, there were underlying linkages between certain agenda items. Depending on how serious the Conference was, even in this prioritization, it might be necessary to revisit and upgrade the status of some of the other agenda items. Sri Lanka just wished to share these thoughts with the Conference. Sri Lanka believed that CD/1840 was definitely a basis for serious negotiations and it should not be rejected out of hand by anyone.

WANG QUN (China) said China took note of the President's remarks, especially when she made clear her wishes and hopes that the Conference could reach a consensus on the work programme, even though it would be a bit late. China also noted that during the second part of the session, relevant delegations had expressed various views on the work of the Conference, including concerns. China hoped that the relevant parties would continue to make efforts to further conduct a constructive dialogue and consultations so that they were able to narrow the differences and reach consensus on a programme of work which was acceptable to all. China also noted that Ambassador Rocca had proposed that the Conference, in late July and August, would conduct informal discussions on the work of the Conference, and that this might a way to help reach consensus on the programme of work.

China noted that the Ambassador of Russia had put forward specific proposals on the issue of prevention of an arms race in outer space. China fully supported these proposals. In general, China was ready to make joint efforts with all the relevant delegations to push forward progress in the Conference.

DON MACKAY (New Zealand) said New Zealand wished to take up a few points which had been raised during the morning discussion on a range of issues. New Zealand thanked the President for her proposal to recommence the informal discussions on the core issues in front of the Conference. New Zealand would be very happy to see this happen as anything that helped refresh the issues in minds of Member States could only be positive, and if it helped advance consensus on CD/1840, it would be invaluable. It was also important as noted by the President to keep their minds on their final report to be presented to the General Assembly on their work during the year. New Zealand noted the proposal made by the Russian Federation and supported by China on the event of a spill over of the informal discussion on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and believed that it was a good idea.

A number of colleagues had referred to CD/1840. New Zealand supported the President's comment that moving forward to reach consensus on the basis of CD/1840 was the best basis for advancing the work in the Conference. It was never too late to agree on a work programme. As far as its national position was concerned, New Zealand would be happy to commence negotiations on any of the core items before the Conference. As a non nuclear weapon State and as a State which had taken strong positions on nuclear weapons, New Zealand particularly wished for the start of negotiations on nuclear disarmament. But they had to acknowledge that the Conference had to start somewhere. The reality was that no delegation here was in a position to begin serious negotiations on all the core issues before the Conference. It was simply not a practical position. It was clear from comments made this year and in previous years that the item that offered the greatest prospect of forward movement was a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) as identified in CD/1840. Sometimes, they looked at FMCT in isolation. As a State, New Zealand wanted to see progress on nuclear disarmament. An FMCT would contribute to nuclear disarmament. The more comprehensive an FMCT was, the more it would contribute. New Zealand would like to see the treaty deal with verification and existing stocks, but it did not expect everyone to agree in advance on the contents of the draft FMCT. New Zealand would argue in the negotiations in favour of including verification and existing stocks.

The third point that New Zealand wished to make was on the statements made by Australia and Japan on the initiative on a new international commission on nuclear proliferation and disarmament. New Zealand very much welcomed this, and it saw considerable prospects for a commission of this sort. New Zealand also welcomed the announcement from the French delegation on transparency and confidence building measures that the French Government was taking and the invitation to participate in them. Transparency and confidence building measures could play a big role concerning nuclear disarmament.

For use of the information media; not an official record

06/24/08 16:00:03

FT. LAUDERDALE, Fla., June 23 -- The U.S. Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement issued the following press release:

A U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)-led investigation resulted in the arrest of two munitions dealers indicted on charges of conspiring to export military aircraft parts to Iran. The defendants were identified as Hassan Saied Keshari, 48, and Traian Bujduveanu, 53. Keshari and Bujduveanu are charged in a federal Criminal Complaint with conspiring to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, the United States' Iran Embargo, and the Arms Export Control Act for their participation in a conspiracy to export U.S.-made military aircraft parts to Iran.

"Today's federal criminal charges of two aviation corporations and their presidents are the result of a long-term investigation by ICE's Counter Proliferation Investigations (CPI) Unit in Fort Lauderdale and the U.S. Department of Commerce and U.S. Department of Defense," said Anthony Mangione, special agent in charge of the ICE Office of Investigations in Miami. "The national security implications of this case cannot be underestimated. This investigation foiled a potentially dangerous scheme to sell and distribute sensitive U.S. military equipment. In the wrong hands, technology like this could be used to inflict harm upon America or its allies. ICE will continue to aggressively pursue those who violate U.S. export laws and ensure the sale and distribution of defense articles is done in a lawful manner."

According to the affidavit filed in support of the Criminal Complaint, Keshari owns and operates Kesh Air International, a business located in Novato, Calif. Bujduveanu owns and operates Orion Aviation Corp., located in Plantation, Fla. The affidavit alleges that since August 2006, Keshari and Bujduveanu have procured U.S.-made military aircraft parts in the United States for buyers in Iran and have illegally shipped the parts to a company in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, for shipment to buyers in Iran. Keshari allegedly received the orders for specific parts by e-mail from buyers in Iran. Keshari then requested quotes, usually by e-mail, from Bujduveanu and made arrangements with Bujduveanu for the sale and shipment of the parts to a company in Dubai. From Dubai, the parts were then shipped on to Iran.

Among the aircraft parts that Keshari and Bujduveanu are alleged to have obtained and illegally shipped to buyers in Iran are parts for the CH-53 military helicopter, the F-14 Tomcat fighter jet, and the AH-1 attack helicopter. Keshari is also alleged to have requested quotes for other parts for other military aircraft, including F-4 Phantom aircraft. All of these aircraft are known to be used primarily, if not exclusively, by the Iranian military. Moreover, all of the parts supplied by Keshari and Bujduveanu are manufactured in the United States, are designed exclusively for military use, and have been designated by the United States Department of State as "defense articles" on the United States Munitions List, thus requiring registration and licensing with the DDTC. Neither Keshari nor Bujduveanu are registered or had the required license to ship defense articles to Iran.

Shortly before midnight on Friday, June 20, 2008, federal agents arrested Keshari at Miami International Airport as he walked off a flight from Atlanta. A search warrant was executed on Kesh Air International, in California, on Friday, June 20, 2008. Defendant Bujduveanu was arrested at his Plantation, FL, home on Saturday, June 21, 2008. Federal agents executed a search warrant at Bujduveanu's home and business immediately after his arrest. Agents found boxes of military aircraft parts stored on Bujduvenau's property, including hundreds of parts for the C-130, the F-5, and other military aircraft.

Both defendants made their initial appearances in federal court today before a United States Magistrate Judge. They are scheduled to appear in federal court again on Thursday, June 26, 2008, at 10 a.m. for detention hearings.

The Complaint, unsealed today, charges the defendants with conspiring to illegally export "defense articles," in violation of the Arms Export Control Act, Title 22, United States Code, Section 2778(b), and to export U.S. made articles to Iran, in violation of Title 50, United States Code, Sections 1701, et seq. (the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)); the United States Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) comprehensive trade and investment embargo against Iran under the authority, inter alia, of IEEPA, as amended, Section 505 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1885, Executive Order 13059 of August 19, 1997, which consolidates the provisions of Executive Orders 12613, 12957, and 12959, and the Iranian Transactions Regulations (ITR) promulgated thereunder, principally, 31 C.F.R. § 560.204. If convicted, the defendants face statutory maximum sentences ranging from five (5) years' imprisonment to twenty (20) years' imprisonment, and face fines of up to $1 million.

United States Attorney R. Alexander Acosta stated, "Today's defendants are charged with illegally selling U.S. military equipment to Iran, thus helping that country build up its military strength. We owe it to the many service men and women who defend us to vigorously prosecute illegal exports of American military equipment."

The investigation was led by ICE's CPI Unit, which focuses on criminal activities relative to the enforcement of national security export control statutes. The CPI Unit is responsible for overseeing a broad range of investigative activities relative to the enforcement of U.S. laws involving the export of military items and controlled dual-use goods, and sanctioned or embargoed countries and enforcement of security export control statutes. One of ICE's highest priorities is to prevent terrorist groups and hostile nations from illegally obtaining U.S. military products and sensitive technology, including weapons of mass destruction (WMD) components. Preventing illicit brokering and other illegal export related activities of United States Munitions List items is a top priority for ICE.

In fiscal year 2008, ICE's CPI Unit conducted more than 2,600 investigations into the illegal export of U.S. munitions and sensitive technology, resulting in 188 arrests, 178 indictments and 127 convictions.

U.S. Attorney Acosta commended the U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Export Enforcement, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Office of Investigations, and the U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Criminal Investigative Service, for their work on this investigation. The case is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorney Melissa Damian.

An indictment is merely a formal charge that a defendant has committed a violation of criminal law. Defendants are presumed innocent until, and unless, proven guilty.

RENO, Nev. - (BUSINESS WIRE) - Vere Software has created an industry buzz about its revolutionary online investigative forensic software which gives law enforcement, the legal community and corporate Information Technology (IT) professionals the tools they need to fight Internet crimes like online identity theft, child exploitation, cyber stalking, credit card fraud, patent infringement and other cybercrimes.

"The Internet is a free and open community. With cybercrime now a global phenomenon, cybercrime has just burgeoned to over $100B globally on the Internet where there is a lack of controls. Internet banking and credit card fraud is now the fastest growing sector of global organized crime, increasing at a rate of about 40% per year," explained Todd Shipley, president & CEO of Vere Software.

LAW ENFORCEMENT

"WebCase will give online investigators the tool they need to assist them in the fight against online crime. No other tool like this exists," Todd G. Shipley added. "It will revolutionize how online investigations are conducted and will be an indispensable tool for evidence collection, organization and presentation in a court of law. The evidence collected and presented will be legally defensible."

James Cornell, CFCE, CISSP, CEECS, CTT+ and featured author of The Best Damn CyberCrime and Digital Forensics Book Period agrees that legally defensible online evidence is the key to successful prosecution of cyber criminals.

"WebCase promises to be the most invaluable partner an online investigator could have by keeping track of information during a case and having it prosecution-ready in moments," Cornell stated.

WebCase™ is a powerful tool for the online investigator and provides the three critical steps for Internet evidence: collection, preservation and presentation. With a user-friendly menu, investigators can easily manage, conduct, acquire and publish their Internet investigations. The software is so unique it has received a provisional patent (applied for) status for WebCase™.

TRY WEBCASE FREE WITH A 30-DAY TRIAL

Vere Software successfully launched its new Internet forensic software WebCase™ offering a free 30 day trial download of WebCase at www.VereSoftware.com

About WebCase™

WebCase™ is the only software solution for online investigations. WebCase™, the flagship product of Vere Software, enables law enforcement, corporations and government agencies to collect, preserve and present, from the Internet evidentiary data including web captures, video recording, TCP/IP collection, image captures, keystroke logging, chat collection, as well as investigative management tools for undercover identities and suspects. WebCase™ Investigative software is the industry standard tool in the field of online digital forensic investigations. It is used primarily by law enforcement and government agencies for searching, collecting, preserving, and reporting online digital data for use in criminal and civil court proceedings.

WebCase™ is also integral in the corporate sector including human resources related investigations, intellectual property investigations, industrial espionage, and any other information where the collection of information online needs to be verified. Trial attorneys and private investigators involved in the eDiscovery process can utilize WebCase to effectively collect, preserve and present online digital evidence to enhance their eDiscovery requests.

About Vere Software

Vere Software is dedicated to producing easy to use tools for the investigative community. Vere Software has developed and launched WebCase™, an online application that eases the ability of an investigator to conduct investigations on the Internet. Vere Software designs tools specifically for the online investigator. Vere Software is a Nevada corporation with its corporate office in Reno, Nevada.

About Todd Shipley, President & CEO - Vere Software

As President and Chief Executive Officer of Vere Software, Todd Shipley is primarily responsible for carrying out the strategic plans and policies, and as such, has the ultimate management responsibility for all company operations. Todd is directly responsible for providing leadership; the creation of its strategic, tactical, and financial plans; developing goals and measuring performance to the approved goals; organizational and customer development; and the development of the company's staff.

Prior to starting Vere Software, Todd G. Shipley was the Director of Systems Security and High Tech Crime Prevention Training for SEARCH, The National Consortium for Justice Information and Statistics, where he oversaw a national program that provided expert technical assistance and training to local, state, and federal justice agencies on successfully conducting high-technology computer crimes investigations. In this position he was also the manager of the National Criminal Justice Computer Laboratory and Training Center. Mr. Shipley has 25 years' experience in law enforcement, with the Reno, Nevada, Police Department, where he developed subject-matter expertise in computer forensics, online investigations and information technology security. Prior to joining SEARCH in 2004, he was a Senior Detective Sergeant managing the Department's Financial and Computer Crimes Unit, where he investigated serious fraud- and financial-related offenses using basic investigative, technical and covert surveillance techniques.

Additional Resources for journalists regarding this news release:

* In Nevada, 93% of the violent crimes committed are tied to methamphetamines. Meth addicts fund their addiction through online identity theft. To watch a video on how Vere Software is fighting methamphetamine abuse with the Crystal Darkness Campaign and Las Vegas Metro. Click here for the video.

* High Resolution Images are available for download. See the image link below.

* To view the expanded press release that deals with not only law enforcement but also Internet crimes against children, cyberterrorism, legal and corporate applications for Webcase, go to http://www.dm-productions.com/vere/veresoftware_pr_6.20.2008 _expanded.pdf (Due to its length, this URL may need to be copied/pasted into your Internet browser's address field. Remove the extra space if one exists).

Vere Software Inc. Douglas Collins, 775-825-1727 Director of Marketing doug@veresoftware.com

Edited by Colonel (Ret) J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr.

Added June 09, 2008

Type: Book

285 Pages

File Size: 1726KB

Download Time: 9 Minute(s) on dial-up

Cost: Free

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Volume II of this edition of the U.S. Army War College Guide (USAWC) to National Security Issues corresponds roughly to one of the two core courses that the Department of National Security and Strategy (DNSS) teaches: “Theory of War and Strategy” and “National Security Policy and Strategy.” Like its predecessors, the complete edition is largely an expansion of the existing materials, although over 40 percent is new, and the previously published chapters have been updated as necessary.