Bombs and Ballots

BY: By Jill Carroll; Julian E. Barnes; Ilana Ozernoy; Kevin Whitelaw
Baghdad

As they vote on a new constitution, Iraqis face the consequences;

BAGHDAD--Scarred by bombs and swept by dust storms, this beleaguered capital is
once again getting dressed up for elections. Colorful posters promoting the new
Iraqi constitution are plastered on the monochromatic walls of the city, most
notably on the concrete blast barriers that now protect ministry buildings and
hotels around the capital. Radios and televisions buzz with talk about the
October 15 referendum, and western-style commercials preach the virtues of
democracy. In one radio ad, a man gripes, "The constitution is for the
politicians!" "No," an upbeat woman reassures him. "The constitution is for us."

    If that constitution is ratified by a majority of Iraqi voters, it is sure
to be hailed as a success by the Bush administration--architects of the
process--and by the Shiite and Kurdish political leaders who drew up the
document. Last week, President Bush said that a federalist Iraq set forth in the
draft constitution is "the best hope for unifying a diverse population." But
minority Sunnis fear that Shiites and Kurds, who dominate the oil-rich areas,
will prosper because of their geographical superiority and leave Sunnis
literally in the dust. "We didn't get what we deserved," says Basam Shimeri, 34,
a Sunni who manages several appliance stores. "We got what was left over."

    Shimeri's gripes reflect the sentiments of the Sunni Muslims, the political
losers in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. Even after Sunnis failed to turn out for
last January's election--because of a mix of violence and ambivalence toward the
political process in Sunni communities--there was hope that the process of
crafting a new constitution would bring members of the disparate Sunni
leadership into a national political accord, an essential step in defeating the
insurgency rooted in disaffected Sunni Arab communities. But it hasn't worked
out that way. After a bruising negotiating process, Sunnis regard the
constitution as providing little for them while benefiting the now ruling
Shiites and Kurds.

    Looking out for No.1. Iraqi politicians during the constitution-writing
process clung to their national patchwork of tribal, regional, ethnic, and
religious loyalties--and grievances--rather than embracing a national identity.
U.S. and outside observers stressed the importance of gaining Sunni inclusion,
but the dominant Shiite and Kurdish blocks did little to cede power. As a
result, there are fears that a "successful" ratification of the constitution may
actually mark an underlying political failure that will push the country in the
direction of full civil war. "It will leave a lot of Sunnis with a feeling of
impotence and an inability to effect change through a political mechanism," says
one U.S. diplomat.

    To add salt to the wound, the Shiite- and Kurdish-dominated National
Assembly made a last-minute change to the referendum--since reversed under
international pressure--to make it essentially impossible for it to fail.
Initially, the election law set a difficult, but perhaps not impossible,
threshold for rejection: a "No'" vote by two thirds of voters in three of Iraq's
18 provinces. As "No" voters began to mobilize in the four Sunni provinces, the
National Assembly reinterpreted the rule to require two thirds of all registered
voters. Though the assembly rescinded the change, the message to Sunnis was
clear: Your concerns don't matter.

    The drama playing out in Iraq's political theater is tinged with irony.
While the Sunnis, the former leaders of this nation, have turned into political
losers, Iraq's long-oppressed Shiites and ethnic Kurds, brutalized under Saddam
's rule, can now exercise political freedoms for the first time since the
creation of modern-day Iraq. And some, like Salam Qaisi, a 37-year-old Shiite,
see Sunni rejection as basically a refusal to accept the ascendancy of the
Shiite majority. "We can't find a perfect constitution because it's not
something from heaven; it's written by men," he says. "But it's the best we have
so far."

    Iraq's top Shiite cleric, Ali Sistani, has issued edicts telling followers
that they have a religious duty to vote in elections. His office denies reports
that he has directed a "Yes" vote, although most Shiites are expected to vote
that way anyway in support of a constitution that enshrines their new political
dominance. Conversely, the Sunni street has been bombarded with mixed messages.
Al Qaeda in Iraq has called on the Arab Sunnis--who account for at least 20
percent of Iraqi's 26 million people--to boycott the referendum, saying it goes
against sharia law, but armed Sunni nationalists have urged them to turn out and
vote "No" to reject the constitution.

    The odds are against the Sunnis blocking ratification. In the three heavily
Sunni provinces, only troubled Anbar province is certain to vote strongly
against the constitution. Polls show that the other two, Salahaddin and Diyala,
are simply too close to call, say U.S. diplomats. In the view of Pentagon
analysts, Sunnis are still likely to reject the constitution in Anbar and
Salahaddin provinces, but in Diyala, they may be outvoted by local Kurds and
Shiites.

    Back to start? If the Sunnis are able to galvanize enough voters to defeat
the constitution, then the process of choosing a new government will start over
and a new constitution will have to be written. This may not be a bad thing,
some analysts say, as it could give Sunnis a sense of empowerment and
participation in the democratic process. On the other hand, Sunnis are a
minority group in Iraq and as such are bound to play a limited role as the new
opposition. "If they show up to vote against it [the constitution], it doesn't
mean that they are stakeholders in the new Iraq," says David Philips, a visiting
scholar at the Harvard Center for Middle East Studies and a former State
Department adviser on postwar Iraq. Typical Sunnis like Shimeri, the appliance
store manager, agree. "They control everything, and we citizens only have our
voices and our votes, and sometimes this voice is choked by them and no one
hears us," said Shimeri, referring to the Iraqi government.

    The Iraqi Islamic Party and some other Sunni groups are now waging campaigns
to educate people about what they feel are the constitution's strengths and
weaknesses and encourage them to vote. "Most of the Sunnis are determined and
motivated to participate in the elections, but we are afraid [the government]
will put blocks in the way of the political process," said Adnan Dulaimi, an
influential Sunni leader who heads a group of Sunnis staunchly opposed to the
constitution.

    Sunni negotiators had some 18 points of contention with the constitution;
those include whether to allow southern Iraq to become a semi-independent state
(which Sunnis oppose) and how to describe the ethnic and religious identity of
the country. But broader Sunni disapproval of the constitution stems not from
opposition to specific provisions, since few people have even seen the document
that has yet to be widely distributed, but rather a desire to issue a protest
against a government they feel has ignored them. "The demands of the Kurds and
Shiites are so high, and they won't accept changes the Sunnis wanted in the
constitution," says Saleem al Jabouri, a member of the Iraqi Islamic Party and
member of the constitution drafting committee. "They gave promises to change,
but didn't."

    Despite the efforts to mobilize opposition to the constitution, the Sunnis'
sense of powerlessness has bred a raft of conspiracy theories that the
referendum outcome is out of their hands. On September 29, American troops
raided Dulaimi's home and arrested four of his bodyguards, saying they were
members of the insurgency. "They did that to put blocks in our way, to make us
not participate in the political process," says Dulaimi, 73, in a cavernous room
in his home, where men wearing the gold trimmed robes of tribal leaders wait to
meet with him.

    Suspicions buzz around coffee shops, mosques, and homes wherever Sunnis
gather, says Niaz Muwafaq, a Sunni from Baghdad's violent Dora neighborhood,
where leaflets and graffiti from some insurgent groups vow to kill anyone who
votes while other insurgent groups encourage Sunnis to vote "No." "In the places
where Sunnis meet, there is a huge campaign for Sunnis to go and say 'No,' "
says Muwafaq. "If you go and say 'No,' you have a voice. You can't do it alone,
but hand in hand we can do it. We want them to hear our voice."

 The Days Of The Bombers

    U.S. troop fatalities were down in September, but the number of
multiple-victim attacks involving roadside bombs, car bombs, and suicide bombers
against civilian and military targets reached a new record.


    [Chart labels]

    U.S. troop fatalities

    0, 20, 40, 60, 80, 100, 120, 140

    March '03, Jan. '04, Jan. '05, Sept.'05


    Multiple-fatality bombings*

    0, 5, 10, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40

    May '03, Jan. '04, Jan. '05, Sept. '05

    * Bombings that killed at least 3 people

    Source: Brookings Institution, Iraqi Index

    Graphic by USN&WR