OSINFO - Open Sources Information

By Michael S. Woodson

Despite more than two years of coalition raids, round-ups and take-downs it is obvious Iraqi insurgents are getting good enough military intelligence to place their bombs where they will hurt the most. And the way they gain the intelligence to put the bombs where they will do the most harm is very likely from the cell phone towers going up all over Iraq.

Cell phone signals are the easiest way for insurgents to communicate. The Army has already acknowledged that doing so is one way insurgents coordinate attacks and detonate bombs. With cell phones, insurgents do not have to wait by a land line for a call, but can be roaming on call while awaiting instructions from their scouts to tell them where to drive their insidious car bomb or place their deadly IEDs.

In Mosul , if you're an Iraqi insurgent, how do you know where a diplomatic security agent is going to be? You either have a range of possible routes traveled by obvious foreigners whose job descriptions you don't know or care about when you attack them, or you have an insider, or both. You coordinate the attack by communicating either on cell phones or radio to put your bomber together with a target so another evil match can be made.

Perhaps it would be useful to consider the lack of cell phone towers in Afghanistan as an example of why not to provide more networked warfare capability. The insurgency in Afghanistan is currently more manageable than the Iraqi insurgency, which by all reports uses cell phone technology to full effect in attacking the troops. Doing so definately brings into focus why the U.S. is endorsing accelerating the construction of more cellular phone networks in Iraq ?

The fact is that the U.S. is building more cell phone licensing capability in Iraq instead of shutting them down to get a handle on the insurgency. In a Pentagon press conference in part about the Katrina response, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Richard B. Myers made the point to underscore cell phone dependence without knowing it, "If the towers are going to go down that control your cell phones and the rest of it, you need to have a better way to communicate."

Why can't this principle be applied against the Iraqi insurgency's cellular communication?

One way to help defeat the insurgency in Iraq is to disrupt their communications by deactivating all the cell phone towers in the areas of Iraq plagued by the insurgency, and perhaps nationwide. Coalition forces need to switch to other, more secure means of communications, such as encrypted satellite phones.

Insurgent rich areas seem to be prime cell phone company markets. Are the insurgents flocking to the best service areas?

The National Communications and Media Commission (NCMC) of Iraq , which is granting licenses to cell phone corporations doing business in Iraq , seeks to increase competition and attract substantial investment in the industry. Shouldn't we find out if the insurgency's operations can be crippled by shutting down the towers for a time before investing Iraq 's future in the market?

There are alternatives to depending on the double-edged cell phones while Iraqi forces establish control over insurgents and arms caches. At Bellows Marine Corps Training Area, the Marines give good reviews to a lightweight, rapidly deployable prototype of a Mobile Modular Command & Control system which could help make the coalition less dependent on cell phones. Take a look. People are thinking of how useful these units would be for natural disasters. Adding their use to defeating the Iraqi insurgency as well as natural disasters certainly seems to make sense.

Practically speaking, this radical approach would mean parts or all of Iraq would be less efficient for awhile, but what is that against the cost of making war? No doubt it would mean more expensive communications in the short run but that is a small price to pay for saving American and Iraqi lives. Doing so is definately worth every life saved and every insurgent communication foiled, since efficient civilian communications mean little if order ultimately breaks down because of efficient insurgent communications.

For Coalition and private groups, satellite phones may be the short-term, high-end alternative. According to published reports, the prime contractor for satellite phone use by the U.S. military has been granted to Iridium, which has been given permission to sell satellite phone service to commercial customers in Iraq .

The caveat: satellite phones must be banned for civilian use until the Iraqi government is formed up and in control of the insurgency.

Perhaps satellite-linked roadside emergency phones that can be patched through to authorities could be placed along Iraqi highways and streets to communicate emergencies and bonafide business needs until the insurgency is out of commission.

To argue that it is too costly ito diminish profits in order to neutralize cell phone towers in Iraq until the insurgency is marginalized is to make the cynical argument that money is more important than the lives of American troops and Iraqi democracy.

Michael S. Woodson is a writer on public affairs, a lawyer and Contributing Editor at DefenseWatch. He can be reached via Mike7Woodson@aim.com. Please send responses to DWFeedback@yahoo.com