Nuclear dangers: How Safe Are Pakistans Warheads?

The Statesman (India)

By Gurmeet Kanwal

The present crisis in Pakistan can largely be attributed to the resurgence of radical extremism and the armys inability to fight it effectively. The spectre of the countrys nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorist organisations has been raised once again by western commentators. Some of them have called for contingency plans to physically secure or destroy the nuclear warheads in the event of a meltdown in the country. LtGen KhalidAhmedKidwai (retd.),Director-General, Strategic Plans Division of Pakistans National Command Authority, held an unprecedented press conference on 26 January to counter international fears of the threat of nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands. A day earlier, his boss, ParvezMusharraf,had done much the same in a speech at the Royal United Services Institution, London.

The Pakistani leadership is quite obviously concerned about international opinion and keen to convince the world community that its fears are misplaced. Grave danger The possession of nuclear weapons by Islamistfundamentalist terrorists will pose a grave danger to international security. The Al Qaidahas declared war on the United States and it allies and Osamabin Laden and Aymanal Zawahiriare known to have made attempts to buy nuclear warheads. India will be particularly vulnerable if Islamistterrorists and their Al Qaidaand Talibanbrothers ever lay their hands on Pakistans nuclear warheads as it is one of the nations that the Al Qaidahas named as an enemy. Being a contiguous land neighbour, India is also easier to target even if sophisticated delivery systems like ballistic missiles are not available. Islamic terrorists can gain possession of nuclear warheads by physically breaching the security ring around them, by subverting the personnel on guard duty or if they succeed in overthrowing the regime in power in Islamabad through a coup. The Pakistani military authorities have repeatedly claimed that they have made elaborate arrangements to ensure that all their nuclear warheads are stored safely. They claim that carefully formulated personnel reliability policies and electronic safety mechanisms have been developed and incorporated by the Nuclear Command Authority. Pakistans nuclear warheads ~ about 30 to 50 in number ~ are reported to be stored at up to six separate locations, with some dummy locations added on for deception. The warheads are stored separately from the launchers so as to guard against accidents and unauthorised use. These are reported to be equipped with electronic locks. An elaborate security system has been instituted for the physical protection of the various components of the warheads. The fissionable atomic core, made of highly enriched uranium, and the high explosive trigger assembly are stored in fortified underground storage sites. Entry and exit into these bunkers is controlled by armed and well-equipped specially selected and meticulously trained personnel of the Security Division of the Strategic Plans Division who form the second tier. As part of the Personnel Reliability Programme,these personnel are screened carefully before induction, are kept under constant surveillance and are frequently rotated. The outer security tier comprises a well-guarded and fortified perimeter fence with strictly controlled entry. Approximately 10,000 troops are deployed to guard the nuclear facilities. Most of the storage sites also have air defence weapons allotted to them to defend against attacks from the air. Personnel selected for the security of the outer perimeter are reported to belong to elite infantry battalions of the Pakistan army. The possibility of any of these personnel being subverted is guarded against by vigilant counter-intelligence teams. Military regimes have very strong survival instincts and the Musharrafregime has ensured that hard-line radical elements are ruthlessly weeded out from the nuclear security detail. The delivery systems of Pakistans Strategic Forces Command, comprising Chinese supplied M-11 and M-9and the North Korean Nodongand TaepoDong nuclear-capable surface-to-surface missiles and their launchers, are based at separate locations. These sites or hides are well-dispersed to ensure that maximum warheads survive a conventional air attack during war. They are also well-defended against possible commando raids. In the improbable eventuality that radical hardliners take over Pakistan, their rag-tag fighters will have to fight the elite army guards to the bitter end before they can lay their hands on the delivery systems. Soon after Musharrafsmilitary coup in October 1999, reports of joint US-Israel plans to seize control of Pakistans nuclear weapons had made headlines Seymour Hershof Watergate fame had written in The New Yorker that commandos of Israels elite Unit 262 and US Special Forces had been rehearsing plans to prevent Pakistans nuclear warheads from falling into the hands of Islamist fundamentalists within and outside the Pakistan army. It had even been speculated that India would willingly provide logistics support for such a venture. Similar stories have again been appearing in the Western media, Contingency plans are reported to exist for the Special Forces to take out or secure Pakistans nuclear weapons, even though it is acknowledged that it is an unbelievably daunting problem. Planners in the Pentagon must appreciate that even though Pakistan is bleeding from serious blows struck by the Frankenstein monster of radical extremism, it still has a professionally trained combat-ready army that will fight tooth and nail to defend the strategic assets against foreign intervention. Hence, a joint US-Israel commando operation to secure or take out Pakistans nuclear warheads in the event of a serious crisis is a far-fetched idea that does not have even a remote chance of succeeding.

Coalition forces However, the possibility that a fundamentalist regime might overthrow Musharrafcannot be ignored. In such an eventuality, the US and its allies may justifiably form another coalitionof the willing to bomb the nuclear warhead storage sites in Pakistan from the air. The coalition forces could employ Cruise missiles and fighter-bombers from stand-off ranges to physically destroy the warheads with deep penetration bombs. Several repeat bombing runs would be required after strike damage assessment and even then there will be no guarantee that all the warheads have been destroyed or rendered ineffective. In fact, a non-kinetic option that employs high-energy microwaves to fry the electronic circuitry of the nuclear warheads may also be considered, either in conjunction with physical destruction of the warheads or as a stand alone strike. These options presuppose that accurate information of the locations of all the warhead storage sites would be available in advance for targeting. The intelligence fiasco about the presence of Weapons of Mass Destruction in Saddam HusseinsIraq and other recent revelations do not generate confidence that this might be so. It is a moot point whether a weak coalition government in India will have the political courage to join a coalition of the willing to secure or destroy Pakistans nuclear warheads. The safety and security of nuclear weapons is best assured by the country to which these belong. Maximum cooperation must be extended by the five nuclear weapon states to Pakistan While the world waits with bated breath for the crisis in Pakistan to blow over, its government would do well to ensure that all possible measures are adopted to further enhance the safety and security of the countrys nuclear warheads and delivery means. The writer is Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi.