OSINFO - Open Sources Information

Text of report by corporate-owned Russian news agency Interfax

Moscow, 11 August: Officers of the [Russian] Federal Security Service [FSB] have detained nine agents of the Georgian special services who "were gathering reconnaissance on military facilities and were preparing terrorist attacks, including on the territory of the Russian Federation," FSB director Aleksandr Bortnikov told the Russian president [Dmitriy Medvedev] on Monday [11 August].

"All the agents are giving evidence admitting their guilt," Bortnikov said.

He added that an officer of the Georgian special services had been detained who had "been staying in the Russian Federation illegally and was heading these agents".

Source: Interfax news agency, Moscow, in Russian 0958 gmt 11 Aug 08

 Preliminary report from the Project on National Security Reform Cites Need for Restructuring of U.S. National Security System (report as PDF)

WASHINGTON (AP) - President George W Bush's new executive order revising rules for intelligence agencies expands the national intelligence director's powers and may further erode the CIA's traditional autonomy.

The order, revised in secret and signed Wednesday, is drawing criticism from civil liberties groups and even lawmakers from the president's own party.

House Republicans on the intelligence committee walked out of a Thursday morning briefing by the national intelligence director, Mike McConnell, on the order to protest what they consider the White House's pattern of disrespect for congressional oversight.

The committee believes it has not been consulted or informed about critical intelligence matters. These include the executive order; Israel's bombing of an alleged Syrian nuclear facility last summer; changes in U.S. intelligence on Iran; the administration's warrantless wiretapping program; and the CIA's destruction of interrogation videotapes.

"This president is making it impossible for Congress to do oversight of the intelligence community," the committee's top Republican, Rep. Peter Hoekstra, told The Associated Press. "The only effective oversight that can be done is out of the executive branch. And this is the fox guarding the chicken coop."

The revisions to an executive order first issued by President Ronald Reagan in 1981 reflect organizational changes in the intelligence agencies after the Sept. 11 attacks. Bush's order lays out the relationships among 16 intelligence agencies.

The work was carried for more than a year amid a national debate, spurred by the wiretapping program, about the appropriate balance between civil liberties and security.

The American Civil Liberties Union quickly condemned the order after its release Thursday, saying it seems to authorize the intelligence agencies to focus more on domestic spying than before.

"We have secret laws governing secret agencies that are engaging in secret spying against Americans, and they're using our own tax dollars to do it. This isn't keeping us safer it's only making all Americans suspects in the eyes of the government," said Caroline Fredrickson, director of the ACLU's legislative office in Washington.

The order directs the attorney general to develop guidelines so intelligence agencies have access to information held by other agencies. That potentially could include the sharing of sensitive information about Americans.

White House spokeswoman Dana Perino said the revision maintains protections for civil liberties that were in the original order. Critics note that Bush's domestic wiretapping program, which some argue was illegal, occurred despite those stated protections.

At the intelligence agencies, there are questions about what practical changes the new order will bring.

For 50 years, the CIA has set the policy and largely called the shots on pursuing and managing relationships with foreign intelligence and security services, many of which provide critical intelligence to the United States.

But the latest version of Executive Order 12333 gives the national intelligence director new power to oversee those relationships, including how much information and the type of information to be shared with a foreign government; the CIA still will carry out day-to-day contacts. The intelligence director is also gaining oversight of covert operations, an area where the CIA has been the traditional authority.

Exactly how disagreements will be worked out between the two is to be determined.

CIA Director Michael Hayden told agency employees in an e-mail message Thursday that CIA officers on "the front lines" will have "a strong voice" in working out the new procedures.

"Issues such as operational coordination and the management of foreign liaison relationships can indeed be complex. But in our profession, the guiding standard is one of common sense. The best solutions are those that get the job done most effectively."

Hayden assured agency employees that the CIA will press hard to protect its interests as new rules and directives flow from the executive order that could change daily operations. In the meantime, however, he told them to carry on as usual.

"Intelligence is, at its core, a practical calling. That, by definition, means a strong voice for those on the front lines, those who do the day-to-day substantive work of intelligence," Hayden wrote.

The executive order gives the national intelligence director, a position created in 2005, new authority over intelligence information collected that pertains to more than one agency. That is an attempt to force greater information exchange among agencies traditionally reluctant to share their most prized intelligence.

The order maintains the decades-old prohibitions on assassination and using unwitting human subjects for scientific experiments, according to a power point briefing given to Congress that was reviewed by The Associated Press. The CIA tested LSD on human subjects in the 1950s, which a Senate investigation revealed in 1977.

The order also gives the national intelligence director's office new power of the purse: It was granted the authority to make acquisition decisions on certain national intelligence programs.

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On the New:

Executive order: http://tinyurl.com/66duv4

From: http://www.dni.gov/

Vision 2015   expands upon the notion of an Intelligence Enterprise, first introduced in the National Intelligence Strategy and later in the 100 and 500 Day Plans. It charts a new path forward for a globally networked and integrated Intelligence Enterprise for the 21st century, based on the principles of integration, collaboration, and innovation.

An Overview

The Purpose of the ‘Stay Behind’ Armies

In the early 1950s, the United States began training networks of “stay behind” volunteers in Western Europe, so that in the event of a Soviet invasion, they would “gather intelligence, open escape routes and form resistance movements.” The CIA financed and advised these groups, later working in tandem with western European military intelligence units under the coordination of a NATO committee. In 1990, Italian and Belgian investigators started researching the links between these “stay behind armies” and the occurrence of terrorism in Western Europe for a period of 20 years.[1]

‘Secret Armies’ or Terrorist Groups?

These “stay behind” armies colluded with, funded and often even directed terrorist organizations throughout Europe in what was termed a “strategy of tension” with the aim of preventing a rise of the left in Western European politics. NATO’s “secret armies” engaged in subversive and criminal activities in several countries. In Turkey in 1960, the stay behind army, working with the army, staged a coup d’état and killed Prime Minister Adnan Menderes; in Algeria in 1961, the French stay-behind army staged a coup with the CIA against the French government of Algiers, which ultimately failed; in 1967, the Greek stay-behind army staged a coup and imposed a military dictatorship; in 1971 in Turkey, after a military coup, the stay-behind army engaged in “domestic terror” and killed hundreds; in 1977 in Spain, the stay behind army carried out a massacre in Madrid; in 1980 in Turkey, the head of the stay behind army staged a coup and took power; in 1985 in Belgium, the stay behind attacked and shot shoppers randomly in supermarkets, killing 28; in Switzerland in 1990, the former head of the Swiss stay behind wrote the US Defense Department he would reveal “the whole truth,” and was found the next day stabbed to death with his own bayonet; and in 1995, England revealed that the MI6 and SAS helped set up stay behind armies across Western Europe.[2]

The Birth of Operation Gladio

A ‘Strategy of Tension’

In 1990, the Italian Prime Minister had confirmed that Italy’s “stay behind” army, termed “Gladio” (Sword), existed since 1958, with the approval of the Italian government. In the early 1970s, Italy’s communist support was growing, so the government turned to a “Strategy of Tension” using the Gladio network. At a top secret 1972 Gladio meeting, one official referred to making a “pre-emptive attack” on the Communists. As the Guardian reported, links between Gladio in Italy, all three Italian secret services and Italy’s P2 Masonic Lodge were well documented, as the head of each intelligence unit was a member of the P2 Lodge.[3]

Setting up the Network

In 1949, the CIA helped set up the Italian secret armed forces intelligence unit, named SIFAR, staffed in part with former members of Mussolini’s secret police. It later changed its name to SID. At the end of World War 2, a former Nazi collaborator, Licio Gelli, was facing execution for his activities during the war, but managed to escape by joining the US Army Counter-Intelligence Corps. In the 1950s, Gelli was recruited by SIFAR. Gelli was also head of the P2 Masonic Lodge in Italy, and in 1969, he developed close ties with General Alexander Haig, who was then Assistant to National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger. Through this network, Gelli became chief intermediary between the CIA and General De Lorenzo, Chief of the SID.[4]

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FT. LAUDERDALE, Fla., June 23 -- The U.S. Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement issued the following press release:

A U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)-led investigation resulted in the arrest of two munitions dealers indicted on charges of conspiring to export military aircraft parts to Iran. The defendants were identified as Hassan Saied Keshari, 48, and Traian Bujduveanu, 53. Keshari and Bujduveanu are charged in a federal Criminal Complaint with conspiring to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, the United States' Iran Embargo, and the Arms Export Control Act for their participation in a conspiracy to export U.S.-made military aircraft parts to Iran.

"Today's federal criminal charges of two aviation corporations and their presidents are the result of a long-term investigation by ICE's Counter Proliferation Investigations (CPI) Unit in Fort Lauderdale and the U.S. Department of Commerce and U.S. Department of Defense," said Anthony Mangione, special agent in charge of the ICE Office of Investigations in Miami. "The national security implications of this case cannot be underestimated. This investigation foiled a potentially dangerous scheme to sell and distribute sensitive U.S. military equipment. In the wrong hands, technology like this could be used to inflict harm upon America or its allies. ICE will continue to aggressively pursue those who violate U.S. export laws and ensure the sale and distribution of defense articles is done in a lawful manner."

According to the affidavit filed in support of the Criminal Complaint, Keshari owns and operates Kesh Air International, a business located in Novato, Calif. Bujduveanu owns and operates Orion Aviation Corp., located in Plantation, Fla. The affidavit alleges that since August 2006, Keshari and Bujduveanu have procured U.S.-made military aircraft parts in the United States for buyers in Iran and have illegally shipped the parts to a company in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, for shipment to buyers in Iran. Keshari allegedly received the orders for specific parts by e-mail from buyers in Iran. Keshari then requested quotes, usually by e-mail, from Bujduveanu and made arrangements with Bujduveanu for the sale and shipment of the parts to a company in Dubai. From Dubai, the parts were then shipped on to Iran.

Among the aircraft parts that Keshari and Bujduveanu are alleged to have obtained and illegally shipped to buyers in Iran are parts for the CH-53 military helicopter, the F-14 Tomcat fighter jet, and the AH-1 attack helicopter. Keshari is also alleged to have requested quotes for other parts for other military aircraft, including F-4 Phantom aircraft. All of these aircraft are known to be used primarily, if not exclusively, by the Iranian military. Moreover, all of the parts supplied by Keshari and Bujduveanu are manufactured in the United States, are designed exclusively for military use, and have been designated by the United States Department of State as "defense articles" on the United States Munitions List, thus requiring registration and licensing with the DDTC. Neither Keshari nor Bujduveanu are registered or had the required license to ship defense articles to Iran.

Shortly before midnight on Friday, June 20, 2008, federal agents arrested Keshari at Miami International Airport as he walked off a flight from Atlanta. A search warrant was executed on Kesh Air International, in California, on Friday, June 20, 2008. Defendant Bujduveanu was arrested at his Plantation, FL, home on Saturday, June 21, 2008. Federal agents executed a search warrant at Bujduveanu's home and business immediately after his arrest. Agents found boxes of military aircraft parts stored on Bujduvenau's property, including hundreds of parts for the C-130, the F-5, and other military aircraft.

Both defendants made their initial appearances in federal court today before a United States Magistrate Judge. They are scheduled to appear in federal court again on Thursday, June 26, 2008, at 10 a.m. for detention hearings.

The Complaint, unsealed today, charges the defendants with conspiring to illegally export "defense articles," in violation of the Arms Export Control Act, Title 22, United States Code, Section 2778(b), and to export U.S. made articles to Iran, in violation of Title 50, United States Code, Sections 1701, et seq. (the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)); the United States Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) comprehensive trade and investment embargo against Iran under the authority, inter alia, of IEEPA, as amended, Section 505 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1885, Executive Order 13059 of August 19, 1997, which consolidates the provisions of Executive Orders 12613, 12957, and 12959, and the Iranian Transactions Regulations (ITR) promulgated thereunder, principally, 31 C.F.R. § 560.204. If convicted, the defendants face statutory maximum sentences ranging from five (5) years' imprisonment to twenty (20) years' imprisonment, and face fines of up to $1 million.

United States Attorney R. Alexander Acosta stated, "Today's defendants are charged with illegally selling U.S. military equipment to Iran, thus helping that country build up its military strength. We owe it to the many service men and women who defend us to vigorously prosecute illegal exports of American military equipment."

The investigation was led by ICE's CPI Unit, which focuses on criminal activities relative to the enforcement of national security export control statutes. The CPI Unit is responsible for overseeing a broad range of investigative activities relative to the enforcement of U.S. laws involving the export of military items and controlled dual-use goods, and sanctioned or embargoed countries and enforcement of security export control statutes. One of ICE's highest priorities is to prevent terrorist groups and hostile nations from illegally obtaining U.S. military products and sensitive technology, including weapons of mass destruction (WMD) components. Preventing illicit brokering and other illegal export related activities of United States Munitions List items is a top priority for ICE.

In fiscal year 2008, ICE's CPI Unit conducted more than 2,600 investigations into the illegal export of U.S. munitions and sensitive technology, resulting in 188 arrests, 178 indictments and 127 convictions.

U.S. Attorney Acosta commended the U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Export Enforcement, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Office of Investigations, and the U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Criminal Investigative Service, for their work on this investigation. The case is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorney Melissa Damian.

An indictment is merely a formal charge that a defendant has committed a violation of criminal law. Defendants are presumed innocent until, and unless, proven guilty.

WASHINGTON, June 11 -- Rep. Frank R. Wolf, R-Va. (10th CD), issued the following press release:

Rep. Frank Wolf (R-10th) today will introduce a privileged resolution on the House floor calling for greater protection of congressional computer and information systems and will offer the following statement revealing that several computers in his Washington office have been compromised by an outside source:

"Madam Speaker, in August 2006, four of the computers in my personal office were compromised by an outside source. This source first hacked into the computer of my foreign policy and human rights staff person, then the computers of my chief of staff, my legislative director, and my judiciary staff person. On these computers was information about all of the casework I have done on behalf of political dissidents and human rights activists around the world. That kind of information, as well as everything else on my office computers - e-mails, memos, correspondence and district casework - was open for outside eyes to see.

"I am aware that computers in the offices of several other Members were similarly compromised, as well as a major committee of the House - the Foreign Affairs Committee. It is logical to assume that critical and sensitive information about U.S. foreign policy and the work of Congress to help people who are suffering around the world was also open to view from these official computers.

"In subsequent meetings with House Information Resources and FBI officials, it was revealed that the outside sources responsible for this attack came from within the People's Republic of China. These cyber attacks permitted the source to probe our computers to evaluate our system's defenses, and to view and copy information. My suspicion is that I was targeted by Chinese sources because of my long history of speaking out about China's abysmal human rights record.

"My office's computers were cleaned and returned to me by House Information Resources, but ever since this happened, I have been deeply concerned that this institution is not adequately aware of or protected from these types of threats.

"I have also learned that this threat exists not only here in the Capitol complex, but also when Members travel overseas. I have been told that, particularly in countries in which access to information is tightly controlled by the government, Members are at risk of having their conversations and information recorded or stolen from their cell phones and Blackberry devices.

"As I have shared my office's experience with other Members, it has become clear to me that many Members, committees and other offices of the House do not fully understand the extent of this threat against the security of their offices and how to protect themselves from it.

"I have no information to confirm this, but it would seem realistic that the Senate could also be at risk. The committees in both chambers on Government Reform, Intelligence, Judiciary, Armed Services, and Homeland Security should be having hearings on this threat.

"That is why I am here today on the House floor. I am speaking out about the threat of cyber attacks from China and other countries on the entire U.S. government, including our military, because of my deep concern about maintaining the security and integrity of our government.

"Computer systems control all critical infrastructures, and nearly all of these systems are linked together through the Internet. This means that nearly all infrastructures in the United States are vulnerable to being attacked, hijacked or destroyed by cyber means.

"The U.S. government has recognized cyber vulnerabilities and threats to critical infrastructures for over a decade going back to the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) in 1997.

"However, despite all the activity, reports, funding, and growth in the Department of Homeland Security, little seems to have changed in terms our vulnerability to cyber incidents.

"If a major cyber attack or incident were to occur, I have read that many analysts are skeptical that the U.S. government could adequately recover and reconstitute the Internet.

"According to a report from the Congressional Research Service, 'U.S. counterintelligence officials reportedly have stated that about 140 different foreign intelligence organizations regularly attempt to hack into the computer systems of U.S. government agencies and U.S. companies.'

"This happens with alarming frequency, according to a recent Business Week article titled, 'The New E-spionage Threat.' This article states that U.S. government agencies reported almost 13,000 cyber security incidents in fiscal year 2007 - triple the number from just two years earlier.

"Lieutenant General Charles E. Croom, who heads the Pentagon's Joint Task Force for Global Network Operations, said that incursions on the military's networks in 2007 were up 55 percent from the previous year.

"The May 31 cover story in the National Journal titled, 'The Chinese Cyber-Invasion,' reported that 'electronic devices used by U.S. Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez and his party during a December 2007 visit to China were invaded using spyware that could steal information.'

"Gutierrez was in China with a high-level delegation to discuss trade-related issues such as intellectual property rights, consumer product safety and market access. The Associated Press also reported on this breach. Why did we learn about this in the press instead of from our own government officials? Did our government do anything about this attack?

"Our military computer networks are a frequent target of foreign cyber espionage, according to CRS. In order to take advantage of technological innovation, DOD uses Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) hardware and software in its core administrative functions as well as in the complex combat and weapons systems of all services.

"However, DOD officials and other analysts have said that COTS products lack necessary security but that requiring these products to meet military requirements for security would be too costly and difficult for most vendors.

"DOD has compensated for these vulnerabilities through additional layers of protective measures; however, despite these measures, DOD systems and computers belonging to DOD contractors remain vulnerable, according to CRS.

"On two separate occasions in 2004, for example, it was reported that viruses were found in top-secret computer systems at the Army Space and Missile Defense Command.

"China in particular is actively engaged in espionage against the United States. I recently had the opportunity to read the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission's 2007 Classified Report to the Congress, and found the report's conclusions to be very alarming.

"The report addresses Chinese activities in the areas of espionage, cyber warfare, and arms proliferation. I strongly urge all Members of the House to read this report, as it gives a clear picture of the threat that China poses to our national security.

"In fact, the Pentagon's 2008 annual report to Congress stated that 'in the past year, numerous computer networks around the world, including those owned by the U.S. government, were subject to intrusions that appear to have originated within the PRC.'

"News reports and CRS have divulged that in 2004, an attack code named 'Titan Rain' accessed sensitive data files stored on the computer networks of Lockheed Martin, Sandia National Labs, and NASA. This cyber attack went undetected for many months, and the hackers that carried out this attack were believed to be in China.

"In 2006, a lengthy cyber attack against the U.S. Naval War College in Rhode Island prompted officials to disconnect the entire campus from the Internet. In 2007, officials temporarily disconnected part of the Pentagon's unclassified network from the Internet in response to a similar attack against the Pentagon.

"In fact, according to CRS, 'DOD officials acknowledge that the Global Information Grid, which is the main network for the U.S. military, experiences more than three million daily scans by unknown potential intruders.'

"According to the Business Week article, in 2007, the U.S. government launched a classified operation called 'Byzantine Foothold' to combat sophisticated new attacks that were compromising sensitive information at the State Department and at defense contractors such as Boeing, the source of which U.S. officials allege is China.

"Business Week's article states that computer attacks have targeted sensitive information on the networks of at least seven federal agencies: the Defense, State, Energy, Commerce, Health and Human Services, Agriculture, and Treasury departments. Defense contractors Boeing, Lockheed Martin, General Electric, Raytheon, and General Dynamics have also been targeted.

"Not long ago, few people within the U.S. government or in universities were systematically studying how a massive failure of our infrastructure could seriously disrupt our economy and way of life.

"Few understood that we could be vulnerable to damaging attacks launched from overseas using only computers via cyberspace.

"The Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Program at George Mason University and James Madison University, which is now six years old, was formed in response to this gap in our knowledge about cyber threats.

"At my request, the CIP Program began producing a monthly topical publication on homeland security issues that is required reading in the Pentagon, Homeland Security, DOE and state and local homeland security agencies.

"Despite everything we read in the press, our intelligence, law enforcement, national security and diplomatic corps remain hesitant to speak out about this problem. Perhaps they are afraid that talking about this problem will reveal our vulnerability. In fact, I have been urged not to speak out about this threat.

"But our adversaries already know we are vulnerable. Pretending that we are not vulnerable is a mistake.

"As a nation, we must decide when we are going to start considering this type of activity a threat to our national security, a threat that we must confront and from which we must protect ourselves.

"The apparent lack of a sense of national urgency to address this problem only gives those who would wish us harm an extra advantage.

'The Government Accountability Office reported in 2007 that no comprehensive strategy exists yet to coordinate improvements of computer security across the federal government and the private sector.

"I strongly believe that the appropriate officials, including those from the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI, should brief all Members of Congress in a closed session regarding threats from China and other countries against the security of House technology, including our computers, Blackberry devices, and phones.

"The potential for massive and coordinated cyber attacks against the United States is no longer a futuristic problem. We must prepare ourselves now and develop procedures for responding to this threat.

"In recent testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell expressed concern not only about sources capturing sensitive information, but also about them altering it.

"Director McConnell testified that 'If someone has the ability to enter information in systems, they can destroy data. And the destroyed data could be something like money supply, electric-power distribution, transportation sequencing, and that sort of thing. The federal government is not well-protected and the private sector is not well-protected.'

"Members need to know how best to protect themselves, their staff and their official business from these threats. I have experienced this threat first hand, as have others in Congress, and am deeply worried that this institution is not adequately protected.

"Congress should take a lead in protecting our government and indeed our country from the threat posed by cyber espionage activities.

"James Lewis, the director of the Technology and Public Policy program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, remarked last year in testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security that '[i]f gangs of foreigners broke into the State or Commerce Departments and carried off dozens of file cabinets, there would be a crisis. When the same thing happens in cyberspace, we shrug it off as another of those annoying computer glitches we must live with.'

"The apparent complacency in both the private and public sectors toward this threat is astonishing! We now know about the threat. We must speak out about how to protect ourselves, and formulate a comprehensive strategy with which to respond.

"Stephen Spoonamore, CEO of a cyber-security firm called Cybrinth, put the matter succinctly in the National Journal article: 'By not talking openly about this, they are making a truly dangerous national security problem worse. . . Secrecy in this matter benefits no one. Our nation's intellectual capital, industrial secrets, and economic security are under dailyand withering attack. The oceans that surround us are no protection from sophisticated hackers, working at the speed of light on behalf of nation-states and mafias. We must cease denying the scope, scale, and risks of the issue. I, and a growing number of my peers, believe our nation is in grave and growing danger.'

"Mr. Spoonamoore is right. We are making this dangerous national security problem worse by not discussing it openly.

"I believe this institution, as my resolution states, should get the facts, and armed with these facts, should take the necessary action to protect the safety and integrity of the House.

"In 1789, British Parliament member William Wilberforce, speaking to his colleagues about the slave trade, said 'having heard all this, you may choose to look the other way, but you can never again say that you do not know.'

"We cannot afford to look the other way when foreign sources are threatening to compromise our government institutions, our economy, our very way of life through cyber espionage. We cannot sit by and watch."

HTS kaka 080612-1607795 KumarA

Jennifer Allen, 202/225-5136.

The Drug Enforcement Administration's Use of Intelligence Analysts, Audit Report 08-23, May 2008

• PDF

WASHINGTON, June 5 -- The office of Sen. John D. Rockefeller IV, D-W.Va., issued the following news release:

The Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, John D. (Jay) Rockefeller IV, and a bipartisan majority of the Committee (10-5), today unveiled the final two sections of its Phase II report on prewar intelligence. The first report details Administration prewar statements that, on numerous occasions, misrepresented the intelligence and the threat from Iraq. The second report details inappropriate, sensitive intelligence activities conducted by the DoD's Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, without the knowledge of the Intelligence Community or the State Department.

"Before taking the country to war, this Administration owed it to the American people to give them a 100 percent accurate picture of the threat we faced. Unfortunately, our Committee has concluded that the Administration made significant claims that were not supported by the intelligence," Rockefeller said. "In making the case for war, the Administration repeatedly presented intelligence as fact when in reality it was unsubstantiated, contradicted, or even non-existent. As a result, the American people were led to believe that the threat from Iraq was much greater than actually existed."

"It is my belief that the Bush Administration was fixated on Iraq, and used the 9/11 attacks by al Qa'ida as justification for overthrowing Saddam Hussein. To accomplish this, top Administration officials made repeated statements that falsely linked Iraq and al Qa'ida as a single threat and insinuated that Iraq played a role in 9/11. Sadly, the Bush Administration led the nation into war under false pretenses.

"There is no question we all relied on flawed intelligence. But, there is a fundamental difference between relying on incorrect intelligence and deliberately painting a picture to the American people that you know is not fully accurate.

"These reports represent the final chapter in our oversight of prewar intelligence. They complete the story of mistakes and failures - both by the Intelligence Community and the Administration - in the lead up to the war. Fundamentally, these reports are about transparency and holding our government accountable, and making sure these mistakes never happen again," Rockefeller added.

The Committee's report cites several conclusions in which the Administration's public statements were NOT supported by the intelligence. They include:

* Statements and implications by the President and Secretary of State suggesting that Iraq and al-Qa'ida had a partnership, or that Iraq had provided al-Qa'ida with weapons training, were not substantiated by the intelligence.

* Statements by the President and the Vice President indicating that Saddam Hussein was prepared to give weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups for attacks against the United States were contradicted by available intelligence information.

* Statements by President Bush and Vice President Cheney regarding the postwar situation in Iraq, in terms of the political, security, and economic, did not reflect the concerns and uncertainties expressed in the intelligence products.

* Statements by the President and Vice President prior to the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate regarding Iraq's chemical weapons production capability and activities did not reflect the intelligence community's uncertainties as to whether such production was ongoing.

* The Secretary of Defense's statement that the Iraqi government operated underground WMD facilities that were not vulnerable to conventional airstrikes because they were underground and deeply buried was not substantiated by available intelligence information.

* The Intelligence Community did not confirm that Muhammad Atta met an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague in 2001 as the Vice President repeatedly claimed.

Additionally, the Committee issued a report on the Intelligence Activities Relating to Iraq conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group and the Office of Special Plans within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. The report found that the clandestine meetings between Pentagon officials and Iranians in Rome and Paris were inappropriate and mishandled from beginning to end. Deputy National Security Advisor Steve Hadley and Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz failed to keep the Intelligence Community and the State Department appropriately informed about the meetings. The involvement of Manucher Ghobanifer and Michael Ledeen in the meetings was inappropriate. Potentially important information collected during the meetings was withheld from intelligence agencies by Pentagon officials. Finally, senior Defense Department officials cut short internal investigations of the meetings and failed to implement the recommendations of their own counterintelligence experts.

Today's reports are the culmination of efforts that began in March 2003, when, as Vice Chairman, Senator Rockefeller initially requested an investigation into the origin of the fraudulent Niger documents. In June 2003, he was joined by all Democrats on the Committee in pushing for a full investigation into prewar intelligence, which was eventually expanded by the Committee in February 2004 to include the five phase II tasks.

The Committee released its first report on July 9, 2004, which focused primarily on the Intelligence Community's prewar assessments of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs and links to terrorism. Those findings helped lay the foundation for some of the intelligence reforms enacted into law in late 2004.

In September 2006, the Committee completed and publicly released two sections of Phase II: The Use by the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi National Congress; and Postwar Findings About Iraq's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare with Prewar Assessments.

In May 2007, the Committee released the third section of Phase II: Prewar Intelligence Assessments About Postwar Iraq.

Separately, in early 2007, the Pentagon Inspector General released its own report on the intelligence activities conducted by the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and also concluded that those activities were inappropriate.

WASHINGTON, June 5 -- Sen. Russell Feingold, D-Wis., made the following remarks:

With the release of the Senate Intelligence Committee's report on Administration statements on Iraq intelligence, U.S. Senator Russ Feingold (D-WI), a member of the Committee, released the following statement:

"This report again demonstrates how President Bush, Vice President Cheney and others made repeated assertions about the threat posed by Saddam Hussein that were not supported by, and at times outright contradicted, the intelligence available at the time. The administration made the case for war in Iraq by convincing the American people that Saddam Hussein had, or was on the verge of obtaining, a nuclear weapon and that he had a relationship with al Qaeda and would provide it with weapons of mass destruction to attack the United States. The administration used the 9/11 attacks to justify a war that has not only been waged in a country that had no connection to the attacks, but has seriously damaged our ability to fight al Qaeda. Sadly, after years of misconduct, these findings come as no surprise. This country is more than ready for a new administration that will be truthful with the American people."

Senator Feingold's additional views included in the report can be viewed here: http://feingold.senate.gov/pdf/views_intel_060508.pdf.